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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN MACROECONOMICS
Zhesheng Qiu
Jose´-Vı´ctor R´ıos-Rull
This thesis consists of two chapters. They explore the role of coordination frictions and
decentralized market in business cycles.
Chapter 1 develops a new framework of level-k DSGE for monetary policy analysis. Incom-
plete markets are introduced to guarantee the eductive stability of the equilibrium. k=1.334
is estimated using growth and inflation forecasts from the Michigan Survey of Consumers,
capturing the missing indirect channels and the weakened direct channels in households’
forecast rules, as well as the wedge between forecasts and realizations. The model produces
inflation inertia under Taylor Rule. In pre-Volcker era, more active GDP targeting gener-
ates more output mean reversion both in forecasts and in realizations. In Great Recession,
the model can explain the missing drop of both inflation and inflation expectations, as well
as the stagnant recovery expectations that leads to slow recovery. The model also implies
both dampening and accumulation effects of forward guidance. When k → +∞, the level-k
DSGE reduces to a basic three equation New Keynesian DSGE model as in Gal´ı (2015).
Chapter 2 poses a competitive style shopping friction on top of an otherwise standard
New Keynesian model and show that it has potential to produce both procyclical labor
productivity and countercyclical labor share conditional on monetary shocks.
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CHAPTER 1 : Level-DSGE and Monetary Policy
1.1. Introduction
The prevalent DSGE models for monetary policy analysis1 usually impose two assumptions
on expectations. First, agents know the aggregate states. Second, agents know the aggregate
law of motion. Although these assumptions are often rejected by data, there is less consensus
on what alternatives2 we should make, and in what circumstances it is necessary. In this
paper, I relax the second assumption, and develop a new framework of level-k DSGE, based
on the idea proposed by Farhi and Werning (2017). The essence of level-k is to turn off the
subtle general equilibrium effects in expectations that arise from more than k − 1 layers of
feedbacks. This framework is appealing because it has straight forward setup, transparent
mechanisms, sharp empirical support, and reasonable performance under multiple monetary
policies.
My first contribution is to lay the foundation for level-k DSGE models. The standard setup
of level-k in games (Crawford et al., 2013) that level-k players best reply to level-(k-1)
is no long sufficient in a DSGE environment for two reasons. First, the ex post budget
balance requires agents to observe the prices when making decisions, so that a temporal
equilibrium (Grandmont, 1977) structure needs to be imposed as in Farhi and Werning
(2017). Second, there can potentially be endogenous state variables3. As a result, states
determine expectations, expectations drive decisions and decisions affect states. This loop
needs to be addressed using a recursive structure. Perceiving all others as one level below
is formalized as taking the actual equilibrium objects one level below as the perceived
equilibrium objects for decision making. All forecasts are made based on rules as functions
of the aggregate states. In addition, the model also allows for non-integer levels by assuming
1Gal´ı (2015) provides the benchmark for small-scale DSGE, while Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2007) provie that for medium-scale DSGE.
2Limited attention relaxes the first assumption (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Woodford, 2003; Angeletos
and La’O, 2013; Gabaix, 2014; Afrouzi, 2017), while least-squared learning relaxes the second (Marcet and
Sargent, 1989; Evans and Honkapohja, 1998; Milani, 2007; Eusepi and Preston, 2011).
3For instance, the interest rate responses to inflation and output gaps is inertial, and level-0 is specified
to anchor their decisions to the last period.
1
a level-1.3 agent perceiving 30% of the others as level-1 and the rest as level-04. Therefore,
the level-k DSGE I propose is more general than those in Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Woodford
(2016); Farhi and Werning (2017); Iovino and Sergeyev (2017).
Another issue is “Eductive Stability”. The recursive level-k equilibrium is well defined only
if it converges to the recursive competitive equilibrium when k → +∞. This property does
not hold in real business cycles (Evans et al., 2017), because households respond too ag-
gressively to interest rate expectations. As a result, the interest rate implied by households’
decisions would exceed the initial range of interest rate expectations. In my model, I intro-
duce incomplete markets to make the planning horizons of households shorter so that they
would respond less aggressively. The extent of market incompleteness is disciplined by the
transition probability from non hand-to-mouth consumers to hand-to-mouth consumers in
Kaplan and Violante (2014).
The equilibrium conditions can no longer be formulated as intertemporal conditions be-
tween current period and next period as in recursive competitive equilibrium. Yet, once
solved, the model still has a state space representation. Multiple steps ahead forecasts can
be obtained only by iterating on aggregate states using the perceived aggregate law of mo-
tion. This feature resembles “Infinite-horizion Learning” as in Eusepi and Preston (2011).
However, due to the incomplete markets, the model can have a simple purely forward look-
ing representation only in a special case in which the steady state real interest rate is zero.
All theoretical results in this paper are obtained under this condition. In the appendix, a
more general algorithm is provided for the computation of the full model.
The specification of level-0 and timing is also worth mentioning. Level-0 households and
firms fully anchor their spending the pricing decisions to the last period. This is consistent
with the principle in level-k games that level-0 agents should be as “dumb” as possible.
In order to circumvent multiple equilibria generated by the simultaneity between decisions
430% percentage of the others are level-1 is different from for 30% probability that all others are level-1,
due to recursive structure of the model.
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making and expectation formation. I specify the timing such that agents do not update their
expectations until they finish making decisions at the end each period, even if they have
previously observed some new information before. This timing arrangement is neutral under
rational expectations, because no observations are informative to the agents if they have
already anticipated them using the correct aggregate law of motion. This setup implicitly
assumes away other forms of learning, and isolates the eductive learning.
My second contribution is to unravel the essence of level-k DSGE. Level-k DSGE is not
the only model to allow for a wedge between the perceived aggregate law of motion and
the actual aggregate law of motion. Gabaix (2017) also explicitly specifies a pair of per-
ceived and actual objects. Level-k DSGE is sharper in the sense that it predicts in which
dimension the wedge is larger. The model implies that in one-step ahead forecasts, when
k ∈ [1, 2], indirect channels are missing and direct channels are weaker. In multiple-step
ahead forecasts, this result will still hold approximately if k is close to 1.
Let’s use simple notations to demonstrate these channels. Denote the real GDP as Y ,
nominal interest rate as R, and inflation as Π. Then, R → Y and Y → Π are direct channels
that are at least partially understandable by agents with k > 1, while Y → Π → Y and
R → Y → Π are indirect ones, and partially understandable only by agents with k > 2.
These results only exist in one-step ahead forecasts, because in multiple-step ahead forecasts,
the perceived law of motion starts to play a role. Take Y → Π→ Y for example. Households
do not understand the effect of inflation expectation of the others, but as their own inflation
expectations go up, they anticipate interest rate movement, and hence understand Y →
Π → Y through R → Y . Quantitatively, this channel is much weaker than the previous
one.
Another interesting feature of level-k is that the forecasts of the forecasts of others are
not identical to the direct forecasts on the same objects. As the forecast horizon becomes
longer, this difference becomes larger. It implies that the infinite horizon assumption is not
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innocuous. This feature is not unique in level-k. Expectations modeled as forecast rules
anchored to the past is likely to be incompatible to the common knowledge of individual
rationality which can be used to achieve the irrelevance of planning horizons. Angeletos and
Lian (2018) and Farhi and Werning (2017) have also mentioned the importance of planning
horizons for firms and households respectively, while my paper uncovers the essence of it
more generally.
My third contribution is to provide sharp disciplines for level-k DSGE. Despite various
empirical works in level-k games to identify the parameter k (Camerer et al., 2004), there
are no empirical counterparts in macroeconomics. There may be two reasons for this. First,
it seems that models in which households keep on learning from the past is more plausible
for business cycle related issues in normal times. Second, it not clear how to identify k.
I argue that level-k is still relevant given historical data for learning, as expectations data
show that households’ forecast rules are systematically biased. There are two possible
reasons why learning does not make households more rational as players are in dynamic
experiments. First, the payoffs of decisions are much less clear along business cycles. Second,
recalling and analyzing historical data for business cycles is much more costly.
I show that k can be identified by exploiting the co-movements between macroeconomic data
and forecast data. Hence, the DSGE structure actually helps identify level-k by providing
dynamics of multiple macroeconomic variables. The missing co-movements for indirect
channels identify k ∈ [1, 2], while the weakened direct channels help identify the exact value
of k .
In the estimation, I adopt Bayesian approach, and use five time series including quarterly
GDP growth rate, quarterly inflation, quarterly federal fund rate, one-year ahead growth
forecasts, and one-ahead inflation forecasts. k is jointly estimated with other parameters,
and also fits the macroeconomics data. The prior of k is set to be very dispersed and cover
the interval of [1, +∞). Yet, the posterior has a tight 95% confidence interval [1.212, 1.467].
4
My forth contribution is to evaluate the performance of the model under different monetary
policies. The rational expectations approach was introduced into macroeconomic modeling
to overcome “The Lucas Critique”. However, agents’ endogenous responses to policies does
not have to be captured by rational expectations. Level-k DSGE provides an alternative
way to model expectations. It can be a useful tool if it performs well under different policy
regimes.
Under inflation targeting Taylor Rule during the Great Moderation, the model can produce
impulse responses of output, inflation and interest rate to monetary shocks aligned with the
data. In particular, the model captures both output and inflation inertia without relying
on other frictions. A rational expectations model can have the identical impulse responses
if it has external habit, working capital loans, and very sticky marginal cost of production.
Still, such a model cannot get even close to the dynamics of forecasts. Level-k DSGE can
produce inertia responses because level-1 expectations are anchored, and the anchoring is
strong if the value of k is not large. Current inflation is determined by the discounted sum
of output forecasts, which is again anchored to the past.
Under Taylor Rule in the pre-Volcker era with more active output targeting, the model
can generate output forecasts more aligned with its backcasts. This result comes from
the property of the model that inflation targeting stabilizes the economy only by stabiliz-
ing households’ expenditures, while output targeting goes though households’ expectations
additionally.
In the Great Recession when interest rate is trapped at zero, the model can explain the
missing deflation, stagnant recovery expectations, and slow recovery in data. The drop of
inflation realizations and inflation expectations is small in long-lasting recessions because
inflation in level-k model does not explode under permanent output gaps, and inflation
expectations only captures part of the movement in inflation. The recovery expectations is
weak because long-lasting stimulus of low interest rate only has small accumulated effects
when households planning horizon is short. The recovery is weak because the expected
5
recovery of output in far future does not help the recovery of current output when planning
horizon is short.
The effect of forward guidance is also unique in quantitative results. Unlike the theoretical
work of McKay et al. (2016); Angeletos and Lian (2018); Farhi and Werning (2017) which
show how forward guidance is dampened, it is accumulative in empirically relevant level-k
models, and can ultimately have a sizable aggregate effect, if the monetary authority has
full commitment power in forward guidance.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 1.2 documents a set of facts
from Michigan Survey of Consumers that are hardly captured by other existing models but
consistent with level-k model. Section 1.3 develops the level-k DSGE model. Section 1.4
highlights the special role of planning horizon. Section 1.5 connects the model to data with
special emphasis on the identification of parameter k using consumer forecasts. Section 1.6
evaluates the model performance under different policy regimes. Section 1.7 concludes.
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1.2. The Missing Forecasts
This section demonstrates a unique set of stylized facts on the consumer forecasts of business
condition changes and inflation rate that can hardly be rationalized without a level-k model.
The data of interest is from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. I explore the disconnection
between forecasts and backcasts of business condition changes to falsify a few theories other
than level-k. I also explore forecast errors conditional on federal fund rate to provide
supported evidence for the level-k model.
1.2.1. Facts against Other Theories
Large systematic forecast errors in business condition changes during 1985-2007 can be
found in Figure 1. The one year backcasts comove almost perfectly with the ex post output
growth rates, indicating that households can observe the output growth rates at least in
aggregate. In contrast, the one year forecasts comove very little with either the backcasts
or the ex post output growth rates. The discrepancy is large and very persistent, rejecting
full information rational expectations.
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Figure 1: Forecast and Backcast Dynamics
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Figure 2 shows that information friction as in Angeletos and La’O (2013) can hardly capture
these forecast errors. According to the theory, agents understand the aggregate law of
motion, but are confused about the aggregate state. However, Figure 2 indicates that the
within sample predicted business condition changes from the autoregression of backcasts is
much more precise than the corresponding forecasts. This indicates that consumers are not
using the aggregate law of motion of backcasts to make forecasts.
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Figure 2: Within Sample Prediction
Figure 3 shows that imperfect knowledge as in Eusepi and Preston (2011) can hardly cap-
ture these forecast errors either. According to the theory, agents do not understand the
aggregate law of motion, but can gradually learn it from historical data. In order to test
this assumption, I replace the within sample prediction in Figure 2 with out of sample pre-
diction in Figure 3. The slop of fitted backcasts is still close to the 45 degree line, while that
of the fitted forecasts is still nearly horizontal. This indicates that the aggregate historical
data of backcasts is not what consumers can easily learn from. It is also possible that
consumers’ individual backcasts are subject to large noise (measure errors), so that they
greatly underestimate the predictive power of historical backcast data. This possibility still
8
implies that consumers learn very little from historical macroeconomic data.
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1.2.2. Facts Supporting Level-k Model
The lack of variation in forecasts conditional on backcasts as in Figure 2 and 3 is not con-
flicting with a level-k model. In the model, level-k agents only understand the comovements
between macroeconomic variables that result from no more than k-1 layers of feedback ef-
fects. When k is no larger than 2, it will be difficult for consumers to understand how
todays’ output level feeds back into output growth in the future through any self-stabilizing
mechanisms.
In addition to that, level-k model also predicts that inflation rate rise (fall) following interest
rate fall (rise) is more difficult to understand than business condition change index rise (fall)
following interest rate fall (rise). Figure 4 and 5 confirm these model properties. The slops
of one year ahead business condition change to federal fund rate in forecasts and backcasts
are very close, while the slops of one year ahead inflation rate to ex ante real interest
rate (federal fund rate subtracting inflation expectations) in forecasts and in reality have
opposite signs. VAR impulse responses functions are not used here because the main focus
9
of these facts are the biased perceived law of motion instead of the propagation of shocks.
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1.3. Recursive Level-k Equilibrium
This section demonstrates how to put level-k friction into a basic New Keynesian DSGE
model as in Gal´ı (2015). The log-linearized form of this basic model is
yˆt =− ω(Et−1rˆt − Et−1pˆit+1 + ηdt ) + Et−1yˆt+1,
pˆit =
(1− θ)2
θ
(κy yˆt − κzηzt ) + Et−1pˆit+1,
rˆt =ρr rˆt−1 + (1− ρr )(φpipˆit + φy yˆt) + σr rt ,
ηdt+1 =ρdη
d
t + σd
d
t ,
ηzt+1 =ρzη
z
t + σz
z
t .
The first equation represents the IS curve that connects the current output yˆt to the expected
nominal interest Et−1rˆt , expected next period inflation rate Et−1pˆit+1, expected next period
output Et−1yˆt+1, and demand wedge ηdt . The second equation represents the Phillips Curve
that connects the current inflation rate pˆit to the current output, next period inflation
expectation, and efficiency wedge ηzt . The third equation represents the Taylor Rule that
11
describes the law of motion for nominal interest rate rˆt . Both the demand wedge η
d
t and
the efficiency wedge ηzt follow an AR(1) process. The timing of shocks satisfies
Et−1(rt , dt , zt ) = (0, 0, 0).
This timing assumption resembles Christiano et al. (2016) in which the current period
nominal interest rate is known only after all decisions have been made.
In order to introduce level-k into this model, we need to introduce recursive level-k equilib-
rium as a solution concept to deal with endogenous state variables in expectation formation,
assume that expectations are updated only after decisions are made to avoid the feedback
effects from current decisions to expectations on future, and impose market incompleteness
to guarantee “eductive stability”. For quantitative purposes, the space of k is expanded
from N to {0} ∩ [1, +∞), and the labor input margin in production is replaced by material
input margin. With all these modifications, the level-k DSGE model still collapses to the
basic model as k → +∞.
1.3.1. Households
There are a measure one of infinitely-lived households with a constant discount factor β,
and an aggregate time-varying demand wedge exp(ηd) multiplied to it.
Timing. Within each period, events happen in the following order:
(1) Households inherit observations and expectations from the end of last period.
(2) Households observe the current gross inflation rate Π. The real net wealth a is deter-
mined by the last period real bond position b−, the last period nominal gross interest rate
R−, and the current gross inflation rate Π through a = b−R−/Π.
(3) Households are hit by idiosyncratic preference shocks ζ ∈ {1, ζ}, with ζ ≥ 1 and transi-
tion probability Pr(ζ|ζ−) = λζ|ζ− . This yields an unconditional probability Pr(ζ) = λζ .
(4) Households observe the real wage rate W and receive a lump sum transfer of real div-
idend D. They consume c and supply labor ` ≤ 1 to get utility ζu(c). The rest of budget
12
is saved in real bond b = −c + W + D + a, with borrowing constraint b ≥ 0 only for ζ = ζ.
(5) Households observe the aggregate output Y as well as all aggregate shocks  = (r , d , z)
that drives the current gross nominal interest rate R, and the next period wedges (ηd ′, ηz ′).
(6) Expectations are updated via level-k reasoning and reported to surveys5.
States and Equilibrium Objects. Denote the vector of aggregate states as S . Indi-
vidual states include the real net wealth a and idiosyncratic preference shocks ζ. Level-k
households take as given the following equilibrium objects:
(1) perceived and actual real wage rate {W e,(k)(S), W (k)(S)},
(2) perceived and actual real dividend {De,(k)(S), D(k)(S)},
(3) perceived gross nominal interest rate Re,(k)(S , r ),
(4) perceived gross inflation rate Πe,(k)(S),
(5) perceived aggregate law of motion He,(k)(S , ).
Households’ Problems. Households have perceptions on their equilibrium policy and
value functions {ce,(k), be,(k), V h,e,(k)} on (ζ, a, S) for the future. These functions solve
V h,e,(k)(ζ, a, S) = max
{c,b}
{
ζu(c) + β exp(ηd) · E[V h,e,(k)(ζ ′, a′, S ′)|(ζ, a, S)]
}
s.t. b =− c + W e,(k)(S) + De,(k)(S) + a,
b >0 when ζ = ζ,
a′ =b · Re,(k)(S , r )/Πe,(k)(S ′),
S ′ =He,(k)(S , ).
In the current period, households observe the actual real wage and dividend {W (k)(S), D(k)(S)},
and have perceived continuation value function V h,e,(k). The actual equilibrium policy and
5 I assume that households do not update expectations until the end of each period using the newly
arrived information of {Π,W ,D} to aviod a twoway feedback between current equilibrium outcomes and
expectations on future. As a result, expectations are inferred exclusively from the aggregate states. Under
full information rational expectations, expectations inferred from the aggregate states are consistent with
equlibrium outcomes, hence {Π,W ,D} provide no additional information. In my specification of level-k
reasoning, there are ex post forecast errors in {Π,W ,D} but households do not learn from them.
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value functions {c(k), b(k), V h,(k)} on (ζ, a, S) solve
V h,(k)(ζ, a, S) = max
{c,b}
{
ζu(c) + β exp(ηd) · E[V h,e,(k)(ζ ′, a′, S ′)|(ζ, a, S)]
}
s.t. b =− c + W (k)(S) + D(k)(S) + a,
b >0 when ζ = ζ,
a′ =b · Re,(k)(S , r )/Πe,(k)(S ′),
S ′ =He,(k)(S , ).
Labor supply does not show up in this optimization problem because it does not induce any
disutility and will always have conner solution ` = 1.
Aggregation. With the assumption that bond b is in zero net supply, and b ≥ 0 binds
only when ζ = ζ, an initially degenerate wealth distribution will always induce equilibrium
with degenerate wealth distribution. Start with a degenerate wealth distribution with a = 0
for all households. Those with ζ = ζ would like to consume more, but are borrowing
constrained. For others with ζ = 1, the equilibrium wage and dividend6 will clear the goods
market such that they would like to choose b = 0. This can be formalized in the following.
Assumption 1. u(·) is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave.
Assumption 2. B(k)(S) = λ1b
(k)(1, 0, S) + (1− λ1)b(k)(ζ, 0, S) = 0.
Proposition 1. Starting from a degenerate wealth distribution in which a = 0 for all
households, the aggregate equilibrium objects {B(k), C (k)} satisfy
B(k)(S) =b(k)(1, 0, S) = b(k)(ζ, 0, S) = 0,
C (k)(S) =c(k)(1, 0, S) = c(k)(ζ, 0, S) = W (k)(S) + D(k)(S).
6Interest rate will not help clear any market because by the timing specification, it is not known ex ante.
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1.3.2. Firms
Production Technology. There are a measure one of infinitely-lived firms. Firm j ∈
[0, 1] uses material inputs mj and labor nj to produce variety
xj = exp(η
z)mαj n
1−α
j ,
where exp(ηz) denotes the efficiency wedge. X is the gross final goods through Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator, and we can also have the variety demand and price aggregator in the following.
X =
(∫ 1
0
x
ε−1
ε
j dj
) ε
ε−1
, xj =
(pj
P
)−ε
X , P =
(∫ 1
0
p1−εj dj
) 1
1−ε
.
With M =
∫ 1
0 mjdj , the net aggregate supply is
Y = X −M.
Timing. Within each period, events happen in the following order:
(1) A random fraction θ of the firms are drawn to keep their previous prices unchanged.
(2) Each other Firm j sets price pj before observing {Π, W , xj}.
(3) Each Firm j ∈ [0, 1] produces with cost minimization after observing {W , xj}.
(4) Real wage W and dividend D are paid to households evenly.
(5) Firms observe aggregate output Y and all aggregate shocks  = (r , d , z).
(6) Expectations are updated via level-k reasoning and reported to surveys.
Cost Minimization. Given real wage W , the cost minimization problem of Firm j yields
a material input mj proportional to labor input nj
mj =
α
1− αWnj .
15
Given N =
∫ 1
0 njdj = 1 and M =
∫ 1
0 mjdj , we have
W =
1− α
α
M =
1− α
α
∫ 1
0
(
xj
exp(ηz)
) 1
α
dj .
The real cost of producing one unit of xj is
Z =
W 1−α
αα(1− α)1−α exp(ηz) ≡
W 1−α
αz exp(ηz)
.
The profit of firm j becomes
Dj =
(pj
P
− Z
)(pj
P
)−
X .
States and Equilibrium Objects. The firms that reset prices choose pa = p/P− as the
new price over the previous aggregate price. Other firms have individual state pn− = p−/P−.
The Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator and cost minimization problem in production are both static,
and hence do not induce any inconsistency between equilibrium objects and perceived ob-
jects. In the equilibrium, we have individual objects {x (k), m(k), n(k)} for firms as functions
of (pn−, S). The aggregate counterpart is {X (k), M(k), N(k)}.
In the price setting stage, level-k firms take as given the following equilibrium objects:
(1) perceived gross inflation rate Πe,(k)(S),
(2) perceived real wage rate W e,(k)(S),
(3) perceived aggregate output Y e,(k)(S),
(4) perceived nominal gross interest rate Re,(k)(S , r ),
(5) perceived aggregate law of motion He,(k)(S , ).
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Firms’ Problems. Functions {pa,(k), V a,e,(k), V n,e,(k)(pn−, ·)} on S solve
V a,e,(k)(S) = max
pa
(
pa
Πe,(k)(S)
− W
e,(k)(S)1−α
αz exp(ηz)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
relative price − marginal cost
(
pa
Πe,(k)(S)
)−ε
X e,(k)(S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
variety demand
+ E
[
Πe,(k)(S ′)
Re,(k)(S , r )
(
θV n,e,(k)
(
pa
Πe,(k)(S)
, S ′
)
+ (1− θ)V a,e,(k)(S ′)
)∣∣∣∣∣S
]
,
V n,e,(k)(pn−, S) =
(
pn−
Πe,(k)(S)
− W
e,(k)(S)1−α
αz exp(ηz)
)(
pn−
Πe,(k)(S)
)−ε
X e,(k)(S)
+ E
[
Πe,(k)(S ′)
Re,(k)(S , r )
(
θV n,e,(k)
(
pn−
Πe,(k)(S)
, S ′
)
+ (1− θ)V a,e,(k)(S ′)
)∣∣∣∣∣ (pn−, S)
]
.
s.t. S ′ =He,(k)(S , ).
Profits are discounted using the real interest rate instead of the stochastic discount factor
of households. It does not make much difference up to first order approximation.
Aggregation. The aggregate inflation and dividend are determined by
Π(k)(S) =
(
θ + (1− θ)pa,(k)(S)1−ε
) 1
1−ε
,
D(k)(S) =Y (k)(S)− W
(k)(S)Y (k)(S)
exp(ηz)
.
1.3.3. Monetary Policy and Market Clearning
Monetary Policy. Denote steady state nominal gross interest rate, gross inflation rate
and output as {RSS , ΠSS , YSS}. Assume these are common knowledge to households.
In normal times, the monetary authority follows a conventional Taylor Rule
R(k)(S , r )
RSS
=
(
R−
RSS
)ρr (Π(k)(S)
ΠSS
)(1−ρr )φpi (
Y (k)(S)
YSS
)(1−ρr )φy
exp(σr 
r ),
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where ρr denotes the level of interest rate smooth, (φpi,φy ) denotes the response coefficients
of nominal interest rate to inflation and output, r denotes the i.i.d. federal fund rate
shock, and σr denotes its standard deviation. If not specified, monetary policy follows
Taylor Rule. When discussing liquidity trap related issues, monetary policy rule must
satisfy R(k)(S , r ) ≥ 0.
The perceived monetary policy rule is
Re,(k)(S , r )
RSS
=
(
R−
RSS
)ρr (Πe,(k)(S)
ΠSS
)(1−ρr )φpi (
Y e,(k)(S)
YSS
)(1−ρr )φy
exp(σr 
r ).
Market Clearing. In each period when agents are making decisions, demand must be
equal to supply in goods market, labor market and bond market.
C (k)(S) =Y (k)(S),
N(k)(S) =1,
B(k)(S) =0.
1.3.4. Recursive Level-k Equilibrium
This subsection establishes a Recursive Level-k Equilibrium. Both households and firms are
level-k. Perceiving others as one level below is equivalent to using the actual equilibrium
objects of this level as perceived equilibrium objects. Therefore, the recursive level-k equi-
librium can be established by iterating on the equilibrium objects. The Recursive Level-k
Equilibrium nests the definition of level-k equilibrium in Farhi and Werning (2017) as a
special case, and allows for a state space representation of the model.
Level-0 Initialization. Level-0 needs to be specify to initialize the iteration on equilib-
rium objects. It is natural to assume that level-0 agents’ expenditure and level-0 firms’
18
price choice are fully anchored to the last period7.
Assumption 3. The level-1 expectations are given by the following statements.
(1) Level-0 households and firms do not change decisions.
(Y (0)(S), Π(0)(S)) =( Y−, 1
behavioral type
).
(2) {W (0), D(0), M(0), X (0)} satisfies
W (0)(S) =
1− α
α
M(0)(S),
D(0)(S) =Y (0)(S)−W (0)(S),
M(0)(S) =
(
X (0)(S)
exp(ηz)
) 1
α ∫ 1
0
(pnj ,−)
− 
α dj ,
X (0)(S) =Y (0)(S) + M(0)(S).
(3) Given {Y (0), Π(0)}, R(0) satisfies Taylor Rule.
(4) H(0) is consistent with equilibrium objects.
Level-k Updating. For ∀j ≥ 1 and j ∈ N+, expectations are updated according to
(Y e,(j+1), Πe,(j+1), W e,(j+1), De,(j+1), Re,(j+1), He,(j+1)) = (Y (j), Π(j), W (j), D(j), R(j), H(j)).
For ∀k ≥ 1, and j ≤ k ≤ j + 1, expectations are defined8 as
(Y e,(k), · · · ) = (j + 1− k)(Y e,(j), · · · ) + (k − j)(Y e,(j+1), · · · ).
7Fehr and Tyran (2008) and Gill and Prowse (2016) have provided experimental evidence showing that
in a dynamic setting, players’ decisions are indeed anchored to the past.
8It extends integer k in most level-k models in a way different from Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Woodford (2016),
but has more transparent implications in more complex models and when k ∈ [1, 2].
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The solution to the temporary equilibrium9 with given expectations yields the mapping
T : (Y e,(k), · · · ) −→ (Y (k), · · · ).
This specification of level-k updating expands the space of k from N to {0} ∩ [1, +∞) for
empirical purposes.
Aggregate Shocks and States. Aggregate shocks  = (r , d , z) and wedge (ηd , ηz)
satisfy
r ∼N (0, 1),
ηd ′ =ρdηd + σdd , d ∼ N (0, 1),
ηz ′ =ρzηz + σzz , z ∼ N (0, 1).
In the Taylor Rule monetary regimes, the aggregate state is S = {Y−, R−,
∫ 1
0 (p
n
j ,−)
− 
α dj , ηd , ηz}10,
while in other regimes, it may also include time index.
Recursive Level-k Equilibrium.
Definition 1. The Recursive Level-k Equilibrium consists of a set of
(1) {c(k), b(k), V h,(k)} and {ce,(k), be,(k), V h,e,(k)} on (ζ, a, S) for households,
(2) {x (k), m(k), n(k), V n,e,(k)} on (pn−, S), and {pa,(k), V a,e,(k)} on S for firms,
(3) {C (k), B(k), X (k), M(k), N(k), Y (k), Π(k), W (k), D(k), R(k), H(k)(·, )} and
{X e,(k), Y e,(k), Πe,(k), W e,(k), De,(k), Re,(k), He,(k)(·, )} on S , such that
1. individual policy and value functions solve the corresponding problems,
2. individual policy functions are consistent with the law of motion of individual and aggre-
gate states, as well as the aggregate objects,
3. monetary policy follows Taylor Rule,
4. goods, labor and bond markets clear,
9The equilibrium for each level-k is a temporary equilibrium (Grandmont, 1977).
10The distribution of variety prices has real aggregate effects.
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5. perceived aggregate objects are determined by level-k updating.
Definition 2. Replacing the level-k updating with consistency between the actual and per-
ceived objects yields the Recursive Competitive Equilibrium.
By definition, when k → +∞, if the Recursive Level-k Equilibrium converges, it must
converge to the Recursive Competitive Equilibrium. The convergence enables us to nest
rational expectations as a special case in estimation. This can be viewed as a way to
compare level-k with rational expectations in empirical performance.
1.3.5. Equilibrium Representation
In models with rational expectations, the equilibrium can usually be represented by a set
of non-linear difference equations. However, it is no longer true in level-k DSGE. Still, the
model has a state space representation in general, and an infinite horizon representation
under perfect foresight or certainty equivalence, but the law of iterated expectations no
longer applies.
State Space Representation. Definition 1 naturally allows for a transition equation
St+1 = H
(k)(St , t),
and a set of observation equations
ln(Yt+1) = ln(Y
(k)(St+1)),
ln(Πt+1) = ln(Π
(k)(St+1)),
ln(Rt) = ln(R
(k)(St+1)),
ln(Y et+4|t) = ln(Y
e,(k)(He,(k))3(St+1)) + σy 
y
t ,
ln(Πet+4|t) = ln(Π
e,(k)(He,(k))3(St+1)) + σp
p
t .
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Here, the multiple step ahead forecasts are calculated assuming all shocks are absent.
{yt , pt } denote the measurement errors of forecasts.
Infinite Horizon Representation. When all aggregate shocks are turned off, the s
period ahead forecast of the aggregate states becomes11
S
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 = (H
e,(k))s(St).
The long horizon expectations are determined by
Y
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 = Y
(k)(S
e,(k)
t+s|t−1).
The whole sequence of forecasts at all horizons, although biased, pin down the optimal
decisions of households and firms, and hence the equilibrium. Similar results can be obtained
if shocks are not turned off but the solution is certainty equivalent or linear.
Iterated Expectations. When there is no aggregate uncertainty, agents would still re-
vise their forecasts after they have new observations that are inconsistent with what they
expected ex ante. When they try to forecast the forecasts of the others, the law of motion
that is used will be downgraded by one level. This will not be equivalent to the direct
forecasts, and the deviation will be amplified by the time horizon.
The accumulation of biases in expectations can be illustrated in the following example.
Example 1. Consider k ∈ N∩ [2, +∞) and  = 0, the long horizon forecast of the aggregate
state can be obtained by iterating on the aggregate state using the aggregate law of motion
at one level below, i.e.
S
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 = (H
(k−1))s+1(St).
11Eusepi and Preston (2011) also iterate foreward on the perceived aggregate law of motion to obtain long
horizon expectations.
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while the forecast of the forecast of others is
S
e,(k)
(t+1+s|t)|t−1 = (H
(k−2))sH(k−1)(St),
Therefore, in each iteration of higher order beliefs, small deviations in short horizon forecasts
can accumulate into large deviations in long horizons.
Accumulative Forecast Errors. The accumulative forecast errors along forecast hori-
zons are not unique in level-k DSGE. In Eusepi and Preston (2011), the accumulation of
forecast errors allows the model to have quantitatively sizable effects from learning, but
the biases in short horizon forecast rules are small due to learning. In Angeletos and Lian
(2018), forecasts errors are also accumulative but do not come from biased forecast rules.
1.4. Planning Horizon Non-Neutrality
This section explores the crucial role of “planning horizon” in level-k DSGE. First, the
model can be viewed as a pair of dynamic beauty contests connecting the discounted sum
of output and inflation forecasts to their current values. Second, “planning horizon” affects
the extent of forward looking due to the violation of “Law of Iterated Expectations” across
agents. Third, short “planning horizon” is necessary for “Eductive Stability”.
1.4.1. Beauty Contests
A few natural assumptions can make the characterization of level-k DSGE more transparent.
Assumption 4. Constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution ω:
u(c) =
c1−
1
ω
1− 1ω
.
This assumption allows us to linearize the decision rules of households, and expressed it
as a function of discounted present value of income and substitution effects. The absence
of labor supply in utility function removes the wealth effect on labor supply from ω, while
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Proposition 1 implies that ω does not affect precautionary saving.
Assumption 5. The steady state net real interest rate is zero, i.e. RSS = ΠSS .
This assumption simplifies the connection between the frequency of borrowing constraints
and the effective discount factor in households’ decision rules.
Assumption 6. λζ|1ζ is large enough, so that assuming b
e,(k)(ζ, a, S) = 0 is innocuous.
This assumption requires that the borrowing constraint always binds under ζ = ζ also in
the off-equilibrium belief. The wealth dynamics of each individual household is degenerate
also in expectations so that we do not need to keep track of it when solving households’
optimization problem.
Lemma 1. After log-linearization, the aggregate state for decisions at period t becomes
sˆt = (yˆt−1, rˆt−1, ηdt , ηzt ). This information set is indexed by t − 1.
Proposition 2. The recursive level-k equilibrium must satisfy
yˆ
(k)
t =(1− γ)
+∞∑
s=0
γs
(
ϕy yˆ
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 + ϕpipˆi
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1
)
− ω
1− γρr rˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1 −
ω
1− γρd η
d
t ,
pˆi
(k)
t =(1− θ)
+∞∑
s=0
θs
(
(1− θ)κy yˆ e,(k)t+s|t−1 + pˆi
e,(k)
t+s|t−1
)
− κz 1− θ
1− θρz η
z
t ,
where γ = 1−
√
λζ|1ζ
λζ|1ζ+1−λζ|1
,
(ϕy ,ϕpi) =
(
1− ωγ(1−ρr )(1−γ)(1−γρr )φy , ω1−γ −
ωγ(1−ρr )
(1−γ)(1−γρr )φpi
)
,
(κy ,κz) =
(
1−α
α ε− (1− α)(ε− 1), 1−αα ε+ 1
)
.
This representation of the model can be viewed as a dynamic beauty contest in which
the current equilibrium variable is a vector of output and inflation gaps depending on the
discounted sequence of its future expected values.
The determinant of the parameter γ indicates that when borrowing constraints are more
likely to bind, households have shorter planning horizons. Farhi and Werning (2017) uses
positive mortality rate to capture this effect in their theoretical framework. In their model,
households react less to long horizon events because higher return rate makes the present
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value of future incomes smaller. This assumption is no longer satisfactory in quantitative
work because an unrealistically high mortality rate is needed, which has no clear interpre-
tation. In my model, a 1% quarterly binding rate is sufficient to generate 10% quarterly
discount rate on responses to future events, due to the incentive of the households to keep a
certain level of precautionary saving, while the present value effect is much less important.
The price rigidity parameter θ plays two roles. The first one is similar to γ, which determines
firms’ planning horizon. The second one is the slop of Phillips Curve.
From this representation, it is obvious that higher expectations on future output and in-
flation always raise the current inflation rate, but not necessarily the current output. The
reason is that the interest rate response to higher output level and inflation rate would
possibly reverse the incentive of spending, and hence result in even lower current output
level.
Example 2. when γ → 0,
yˆ
(k)
t = yˆ
e,(k)
t+1|t−1 − ω(rˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1 − pˆi
e,(k)
t+1|t−1 + η
d
t ).
This example shows that when γ → 0, the model with arbitrary subjective expectations
has the identical households block as the approach which first derives equilibrium condi-
tions under rational expectations, and then replace rational expectations with subjective
expectations as in Milani (2007).
Example 3. If the model converges when k → +∞, then when k → +∞,
yˆ
(k)
t =yˆ
e,(k)
t+1|t−1 − ω(rˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1 − pˆi
e,(k)
t+1|t−1 + η
d
t ),
pˆi
(k)
t =pˆi
e,(k)
t+1|t−1 +
(1− θ)2
θ
(κy yˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1 − κzηzt ).
Since expectations are unbiased when k → +∞, this indicates that level-k DSGE nests the
rational expectations DSGE as a special case.
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1.4.2. Planning Horizon
The following corollary can be used to demonstrate what makes planning horizon relevant
in level-k DSGE.
Corollary 1. The level-k IS curve can be reformulated in the following
yˆ
(k)
t = yˆ
e,(k)
t+1|t−1 − ω(rˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1 − pˆi
e,(k)
t+1|t−1 + η
d
t ) + (1− γ)
+∞∑
s=1
γs(yˆ
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 − yˆ
e,(k)
(t+1+s|t)|t−1)
− ω
+∞∑
s=1
γs [(rˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 − rˆ
e,(k)
(t+s|t)|t−1)− (pˆi
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 − pˆi
e,(k)
(t+1+s|t)|t−1)].
When the Law of Iterated Expectations holds across agents, this equation reduces to
yˆ
(k)
t = yˆ
e,(k)
t+1|t−1 − ω(rˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1 − pˆi
e,(k)
t+1|t−1 + η
d
t ).
According to Corollary 1, planning horizon matters because the “Law of Iterated Expec-
tation” no longer holds across agents. For example, a level-2 agent form expectations as if
others are level-1, while they forecast the forecasts of others as if they arise from level-0.
This issue not only exists in level-k models. The derivation of Corollary 1 implicitly as-
sumes that agents understand “individual rationality”. If we relax the level-k assumptions
expectations but instead impose “Law of Iterated Expectation” on Corollary 1, then the
admissible set of subjective expectations will be very restricted. See the following example
for illustration.
Example 4. Consider an example in which
(1) level-k is relaxed,
(2) 1− θ = r = ηd = 0, φy ≥ 0, and
(3) the perceived Taylor Rule is rˆ et+s|t−1 = φy yˆ
e
t+s|t−1, then
yˆ et+1|t−1 = (1− γ)
+∞∑
s=0
γs
(
yˆ et+2+s|t−1 −
ωφy
1− γ yˆ
e
t+1+s|t−1
)
.
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Now, consider a perceived law of motion yˆ et|t−1 = ρ
e
y yˆ
e
t−1. Assume that the “Law of Iterated
Expectation” also holds across time, which is a natural assumption when individual ratio-
nality is not violated, we can iterate on the perceived law of motion for output to obtain
long horizon expectations. As a result, we must have either ρey = 0 or ρ
e
y = 1 + ωφy ≥ 1.
In another word, anchored expectations are not admissible in this example.
There are two cases in which planning horizon does not play a role. The first case is
k → +∞, which corresponds to rational expectations as is standard in most DSGE models.
In this case, the “Law of Iterated Expectations” holds across both time and agents, but
expectations will no long be anchored by historical data. The second case is γ → 0,
which corresponds to the “Euler Equation Learning” approach as in Milani (2007) and
Milani (2011). In this case, long run expectations are assumed not to play a role. As
in Example 4, anchored expectations are not likely to be compatible with the common
knowledge of individual rationality. In summary, planning horizon is likely to play a key
role in determining equilibrium output, if we would like to have expectations anchored to the
past. This issue exists even if the anchoring does not arise from non-rational expectations
(Angeletos and Lian, 2018).
The following proposition summarizes the real effects of planning horizon γ.
Proposition 3. When ηd = ηz = 0 and k ∈ [1, 2], we have
yˆ
(k)
t = −
ω
1− γρr rˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1 + (k − 1)(1− γ)(1− θ)κyϕpi yˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1 + δ(1− γ)
+∞∑
s=0
γs yˆ
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1,
where δ = 1− ωγ1−γ
[
(k − 1)(1− θ)κy
(
1−ρr
1−γρr γφpi − 1
)
+ 1−ρr1−γρr φy
]
.
This proposition indicates that (1− γ)∑+∞s=0 γs yˆ e,(k)t+1+s|t−1 is crucial in determining the cur-
rent equilibrium output, and δ captures the size of this effect. Here, γ plays two roles.
First, smaller γ implies that households care more about the near future than the far fu-
ture. Second, smaller γ leads to larger δ and hence makes households more responsive to
expectations. Taking stock, when level-k output expectations anchors the past, smaller γ
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leads to stronger anchoring.
In addition to γ, {k , θ,φpi,φy} all affect δ. {k , θ} affect δ in the same way, as lower level
reasoning and price flexibility both dampen the self-stabilizing channel in expectations
through making inflation expectations less responsive. {φpi,φy} both dampens the effects
of expectations, but the relative role of φpi is affected by k − 1 because it has to operate
through inflation expectations, and affects the equilibrium output only indirectly.
1.4.3. Eductive Stability
The convergence to rational expectations when k → +∞ is difficult to characterize in the
full model. Still, some transparent results can be obtained when ρr = φpi = 0. The goal is
to show why γ plays a crucial role in “Eductive Stability”. The role of γ in the full model
is similar.
Lemma 2. When ρr = φpi = η
d = ηz = 0 and k ∈ N++, the law of motion for output
satisfies yˆ
(k)
t = ρ
(k)
y yˆt−1, and ρ
(k)
y satisfies
ρ
(k)
y
ρ
(k−1)
y
= −ωφy +
(
1− ωγ
1− γφy
)
(1− γ)ρ(k−1)y
1− γρ(k−1)y
.
Definition 3. Under the same environment, “Eductive Stability” is defined as the following:
∃M ∈ [0, 1), such that for ∀ρ(k−1)y with |ρ(k−1)y | ≤ 1, | ρ
(k)
y
ρ
(k−1)
y
| ≤ M.
The requirement that the convergence speed must be uniformly fast than some lower bound
does not lose any generality because the mapping from ρ
(k−1)
y to ρ
(k)
y itself is uniform.
If we allow ρ
(0)
y to be specified in an arbitrary way, then “Eductive Stability” will become a
sufficient and necessary condition to guarantee that the convergence to rational expectations
when κ→ +∞ is monotonic in absolute values. Due to the monotonicity of ρ
(k)
y
ρ
(k−1)
y
in ρ
(k−1)
y
for |ρ(k−1)y | ≤ 1, it is easy to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When ρr = φpi = η
d = ηz = 0 and k ∈ [1, +∞) ∩ N, the sufficient and
necesary condition for “Eductive Stability” is γ ∈ ( 12ωφy , 1− 12ωφy ).
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In standard parameterization, the γ > 12ωφy is always satisfied, while γ < 1− 12ωφy is usually
not. For instance, when (ω,φy ) = (0.5, 0.2), “Eductive Stability” requires γ ∈ (0.05, 0.95).
Complete market models are observationally equivalent to γ = β > 0.95, while incomplete
market models can have γ < 0.95. This result resembles the findings in Evans et al. (2017)
that the long planning horizon destroys the “Eductive Stability”.
The proof of “Eductive Stability” is complex and less illuminating in the full model. Yet,
the main insight is similar. Too strong self-stabilizing feedback from Taylor Rule and
consumption response would make the equilibrium output responding negatively to output
expectations, which is strongly contradictory to common sense.
There is a crucial parameter δ we could take a closer look. This parameter describes how
the equilibrium output reacts to its expectations along all horizons. “Eductive Stability”
requires this parameter to be large enough. From the expression of δ as in Proposition 3,
we can see that (1) γ plays a similar role as in Lemma 2; (2) smaller k and 1 − θ both
increase the likelihood of “Eductive Stability” directly, and in addition makes inflation
targeting less likely to destroy “Eductive Stability” indirectly; (3) ρr does not play a large
role. Therefore, we can conclude that level-k model is more likely to be a useful tool for
business cycle questions in the presence of incomplete markets and nominal rigidities.
1.5. Asymmetric Reasoning
The major feature of level-DSGE is the “asymmetric reasoning” in forecast rules. House-
holds can understand the comovements between macroeconomic variables that have direct
connections, but not those that must be inferred from feedback effects. This section for-
malizes this feature of the model, takes the model to take, and evaluates its quantitative
impact.
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1.5.1. Testable Forecast Rules
One Step Ahead Forecasts. When k ∈ (1, 2], the macroeconomic comovements that
arise from feedback effects are not understandable by agents, so that part of the state
variables are missing in their forecast rules.
Proposition 5. Level-k expectations for k ∈ [1, 2] are given by
yˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1 − yˆt−1 =(k − 1)ω
(
− 1− ρr
1− γρr
φy
1− γ yˆt−1 −
ρr
1− γρr rˆt−1 −
1
1− γρd η
d
t
)
,
pˆi
e,(k)
t|t−1 =(k − 1)(1− θ)
(
κy yˆt−1 − κz
1− θρz η
z
t
)
.
This proposition has the following implications. First, the monetary policy rule is only
partly understood, in the sense that only the interest rate response to output fluctuations
is incorporated into the one-quarter ahead forecast rules. Second, if interest rate does not
respond to output, then the forecast rules exhibits “asymmetric reasoning”, in the sense
that interest rate is only used to forecast output growth, while output level is only used
to forecast inflation in the next quarter. Third, agents’ reasoning is asymmetric in a way
that only the direct effects shows up in forecast rules, while the feedback effects are absent.
Forth, the coefficients on all state variables in forecast rules are proportional to k−1, which
looks as if k − 1 represents households’ awareness of direct effects.
Mutiple Step Ahead Forecasts. The nice results in one quarter ahead forecasts do not
carry on directly to multiple step ahead forecasts.
Corollary 2. When φy = η
d = ηz = 0 and k ∈ [1, 2], we have
∂yˆ
e,(k)
t+3|t−1
∂yˆt−1
− 1 =− ψφpi(1 + ρ2r − ψφpi),
∂pˆi
e,(k)
t+3|t−1
∂ rˆt−1
=− ψ(1 + ρr + ρ
2
r − ψφpi)
1− ρr ,
where ψ = (k − 1)2(1− θ)κyω ρr (1−ρr )1−γρr ,
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The missing channels in Proposition 5 are no longer missing here. Yet, their sizes are
in the same order of magnitude as the small ψ. Agents are aware of the self-stabilizing
forces because they have non-trivial inflation expectations, and understand that interest
rate responds to it. These two channels will be used to compute the perceived law of
motion. However, both of them are much weaker than reality due to the dampening effects
of level-k when k is close to 1. In addition, growth and inflation expectations are formed
without using the expectations of the others, which also makes expectations less responsive
than reality.
As a result, as long as k is close to 1, the “asymmetric reasoning” is still a distinct feature
of the one-year ahead forecast rules. Therefore, we can still use the data implied forecast
rules to test whether expectations are correctly specified in the level-k model.
1.5.2. Taking Model to Data
Calibrate Planning Horizon γ. Recall the equation that determines the value of γ
γ = 1−
√√√√ λζ|1ζ
λζ|1ζ + 1− λζ|1
.
Two parameters {λζ|1, ζ} need to be calibrated.
According to Kaplan et al. (2014), the probability that a non-hand-to-mouth consumer
remains non-hand-to-mouth after one quarter is 0.967, and hence λζ|1 = 0.967. Set ζ =
1.2 or 1.5 or 2.0 to get γ = 0.802 or 0.779 or 0.747. γ = 0.8 is taken as the benchmark.
State Space Representations. The state space representation has a transition equation
sˆt+1 =

yˆt
rˆt
ηdt+1
ηzt+1

= Γss,(k)

yˆt−1
rˆt−1
ηdt
ηzt

+

0
σr 
r
t
σd
d
t
σz
z
t

,
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and a measurement equation

yˆt+1 − yˆt
pˆt+1 − pˆt
rˆt
yˆ et+4|t − yˆt
pˆet+4|t − pˆt

=

Γys,(k) − Γy
Γpis,(k)
Γr
Γys,e,(k)(Γss,e,(k))3 − Γy
Γpis,e,(k)
∑3
τ=0(Γ
ss,e,(k))τ

sˆt+1 +

0
0
0
σy 
y
t
σp
p
t

,
where Γss,(k) and Γss,e,(k) denote the actual and perceived law of motion for the recur-
sive level-k equilibrium, Γys,(k) and Γps,(k) denote the actual function of output and in-
flation, Γys,e,(k) and Γps,e,(k) denote the perceived functions or the forecast rules of out-
put and inflation, Γy and Γr extract output and interest rate from the vector of aggre-
gate states. {rt , dt , zt , yt , pt } are i.i.d. standard normally distributed, in which {rt , dt , zt }
stand for exogenous shocks driving aggregate states, while {yt , pt } are measurement errors.
{σrt ,σdt ,σzt ,σyt ,σpt } denote the standard deviation of all these shocks.
Time Series Observables. The macroeconomic data range from the first quarter of 1985
to the last quarter of 2007, covering the period of the Great Moderation. The quarterly
real GDP Yt is used to construct output growth rate, quarter GDP deflator Pt is used to
construct inflation, and annualized federal fund rate rt is used to construct nominal interest
rate.
yˆt+1 − yˆt =detrend(ln Yt+1 − ln Yt),
pˆt+1 − pˆt =detrend(ln Pt+1 − ln Pt),
rˆt =detrend(rt)/4,
where detrend(·) represents for the linear detrending operator.
The forecast data is taken from Michigan Survey of Consumers in the same time range.
It includes the backcast index of yearly business condition change bagot , forecast index of
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yearly business condition change bexpt , and forecast of yearly inflation rate inflmedian12t .
The one year ahead output growth rate forecast is constructed assuming perfect recall and
the one year ahead inflation rate forecast is taken from the median value of the survey
response directly.
yˆ et+4|t − yˆt =detrend
[∑
bagot(ln Yt − ln Yt−4)∑
bago2t
· bexpt
]
,
pˆet+4|t − pˆt =detrend(inflmedian12t).
Baynesian Estimation. Set κy = 2 to capture the 50% intermediate input share as in
Bils et al. (2018). The prior and posterior distributions of other parameters are summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Parameters
Parameters Prior shape Prior Mean Prior S.D. Post. Mean 95% Band
k Uniform 1/k 1.334 [1.212,1.467]
ω Normal 1.000 0.500 0.075 [0.036,0.114]
θ Uniform 0.925 [0.896,0.945]
φpi Normal 1.500 0.500 1.636 [0.767,2.844]
φy Normal 0.200 0.100 0.102 [-0.001,0.214]
ρr Uniform 0.915 [0.869,0.957]
ρd Uniform 0.237 [0.076,0.440]
ρz Uniform 0.878 [0.844,0.914]
400σr InvGamma 0.500 4.000 0.435 [0.384,0.507]
100σd InvGamma 1.000 4.000 4.160 [2.178,8.996]
100κzσz InvGamma 5.000 4.000 5.562 [3.397,8.794]
100σy InvGamma 0.300 4.000 0.307 [0.262,0.358]
100σp InvGamma 0.500 4.000 0.373 [0.323,0.431]
The prior of k is chosen such that k = +∞ can be drawn with the same probability as
k = 1 without data. For parameters {ω,φpi,φy} that can take the values in R, the prior
distribution is assumed to be normal. For parameters {θ, ρr , ρd , ρz} that can only take
values in [0, 1], the prior distribution is assumed to be uniform.
k = 1.334 is close to the results in experimental games as in Camerer et al. (2004). Although
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ω is much smaller than 1, it is consistent with macro level estimates as summarized by
Havranek (2015). θ is very close to 1 due to the absence of wage rigidity. φpi = 1.636 is
quite standard. φy is close to 0 because higher values will lead to very strong self-stabilizing
force in expectations, which is absent in the data. ρr = 0.915 is standard in the literature. ρd
much smaller than 1 indicates that the model has strong internal propagation mechanism for
aggregate demand. ρz not close to 1 indicates that the model is unlikely to be misspecified
in terms of stationarity. σy and σp are both smaller than the standard deviations of growth
and inflation forecasts, which are very difficult to get if the expectations formation process
is not properly specified.
1.5.3. Quantitative Forecast Wedges
Forecast Dynamics. Figure 6 and 7 compare forecasts in the model, with forecasts in
the data and reality in the data for both output growth and inflation.
The volatility of output growth forecasts in both model and data is much lower than reality.
The forecast errors are large, persistent and countercyclical, which indicates that households
expectations’ are driven by endogenous waves of optimism and pessimism. The model
implied forecasts generally fits the data counterpart well. The rise of growth forecasts
during the early 2000s and the fall of them during the late 2000s in the data that seems
difficult to capture by the model are aligned with news shocks as in Barsky and Sims (2012).
Inflation forecasts are also much less volatile than the reality. The model generally captures
the overpredict of inflation during the IT boom in the late 1990s, and the underpredict of
inflation during the housing booms in the middle of 2000s. Yet, it does not fully capture
the rise of inflation expectations during the late 1980s. This discrepancy is very difficult
to clean up because k is exogenous in the model. Once I raise k to capture the inflation
expectations during the late 1980s, the fit of inflation expectations during other periods will
be much worse.
It would be ideal if we have the data of interest rate expectations. Unfortunately, the data
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provided by Michigan Survey of Consumers is only qualitative, and there is no easy to
transform it into quantitative measures.
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Figure 6: Forecast Dynamics of Output Growth
Wedges in Forecast Rules. A distinct feature of level-k DSGE model is the wedge
between forecasts and reality. Table 2 summarizes the wedges by comparing the corre-
sponding law of motion for output growth and inflation. The indirect channels that are
hard to understand by households are marked by shaded areas.
In Table 2, state variables are used as the regressors in the forecast rule regression to check
model fit. {ηˆd , ηˆz} are model implied structural shocks. yˆ et+4|t − yˆt and pˆet+4|t − pˆt are one
year ahead growth and inflation forecasts. Et yˆt+4− yˆt and Et pˆt+4− pˆt are the unbiased one
year ahead growth and inflation expectations. If forecast rules in the model are correctly
specified, then the model implied measurement errors should be i.i.d., hence the estimated
forecast rules should be identical for model and data. If the equilibrium problem in the
model are correctly specified, then structural shocks should be i.i.d., and the estimated
unbiased expectations rules should also be identical for model and data. The regression
results indicate that the misspecification is only mild.
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Figure 7: Forecast Dynamics of Inflation Rate
The regressions in Table 2 indicate that the model generally captures the wedges between
the forecast rules and the unbiased expectations rules. The indirect connection between
output level and output growth forecasts, and that between interest rate and inflation rate
forecasts are missing in both model and data. The direct connection between interest rate
and output growth forecasts, and that between output level and inflation rate forecasts are
there but much weaker in both model and data.
Identification of Level-k. The main identification of level-k comes from the forecast
rules. Figure 8 plots the coefficient differences between the model implied forecast rules
and the data implied forecast rules, normalized by the standard errors of the later.
The two indirect channels, growth forecasts conditioning on output level and inflation fore-
cast conditioning on interesting rate, can identify k ∈ [1, 2], because they obtain best fit
only in this range; while the two direct channels, growth forecasts conditioning on interest
rate and inflation forecast conditioning on output level, help identify k given k ∈ [1, 2],
because they have additional best fit points outside [1, 2] but are more sensitive to k within
[1, 2].
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Table 2: Wedges in Forecast Rules
yˆ et+4|t − yˆt Et yˆt+4 − yˆt
Model Data Model Data
yˆt −0.022 0.023
[−0.009,0.055]
−0.249 −0.126
[−0.248,−0.005]
rˆt −0.298 −0.531
[−0.683,−0.379]
−1.945 −1.352
[−1.930,−0.773]
ηdt+1 −0.040 −0.009
[−0.020,0.001]
−0.141 −0.136
[−0.176,−0.096]
ηzt+1 0.001 0.008
[−0.001,0.016]
0.016 0.030
[−0.002,0.062]
R2 0.402 0.526
pˆet+4|t − pˆt Et pˆt+4 − pˆt
Model Data Model Data
yˆt 0.100 0.068
[0.028,0.107]
0.320 0.279
[0.233,0.326]
rˆt −0.012 0.457
[0.271,0.643]
−0.463 −0.316
[−0.537,−0.094]
ηdt+1 −0.003 0.009
[−0.004,0.022]
−0.043 −0.013
[−0.028,0.003]
ηzt+1 −0.034 −0.040
[−0.050,−0.030]
−0.110 −0.077
[−0.089,−0.065]
R2 0.552 0.719
1.6. Alternative Policies
This section evaluates the model performance under four alternative monetary policies. The
robustness of model performance can provide additional support for the usefulness of level-k
DSGE. The four polices includes Taylor Rule during the Great Moderation, Taylor Rule
during in Pre-Volcker era, Liquidity Trap in the Great Recession, and Forward Guidance.
1.6.1. Great Moderation
Impulse Reponses. Figure 9 plots the impulse response functions to -1 standard devia-
tion of federal fund rate shocks. The model generated responses are well aligned with those
produced by a structural VAR.
Inflation Inertia. According to the top-left panel, the response of output is hump-
shaped. One potential reason is the highly anchored forecasts of future output dynamics.
Corollary 2 has provided the intuition of it.
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Figure 8: Identification of Level-k
More interesting is the inflation inertia from the right-bottom panel. Under rational expec-
tations, it is not easy to have such results without inflation indexation or working capital
loans. The following proposition demonstrates how level-k DSGE produces inflation inertia.
Proposition 6. When k ∈ [1, 2] and ηzt = 0,
pˆi
(k)
t = (1− θ)κy
{
(k − 1)(1− θ)yˆt−1 + [1 + θ(k − 1)](1− θ)
+∞∑
s=0
θs yˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1
}
.
This proposition shows that the current inflation is driven by output forecasts, and we have
known previously that the forecasts of output paths are highly anchored to the past.
Observational Equivalence. Under rational expectations, other frictions are needed to
produce the same impulse responses.
Proposition 7. The following model with full information rational expectations, external
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Figure 9: Impulse Reponses to Monetary Shocks
habit and within period working capital loans
yˆt − yˆt−1 =− 1− h˜
h˜
ω˜(rˆt − pˆit+1) + 1− wyss(1− ω˜)
h˜
(yˆt+1 − yˆt),
pˆit =
(1− θ˜)2
θ˜
[
κ˜y
(
1
1− h˜
yˆt − h˜
1− h˜
yˆt−1
)
+ rˆt
]
+ pˆit+1,
rˆt =ρr rˆt−1 + (1− ρr )(φpipˆit + φy yˆt),
where (h˜, ω˜, κ˜y , θ˜) = (0.863, 0.730, 0.068, 0.749) has the identical impulse response functions
to FFR shocks as the level-k DSGE. Here wyss = 2/3 denotes the steady state labor share.
Compared with this model, level-k DSGE has its own merit because it has the same number
of parameters but captures additionally the forecast dynamics. κ˜y = 0.068 also explains
why very sticky wage is needed in Christiano et al. (2005) to amplify the role of working
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capital.
1.6.2. Pre-Volcker Era
Growth Forecasts Across Regimes. Extending the sample range from 1985q1-2007q4
to 1965q1-2007q4 for Figure 1 to get Figure 10, we see that the backcasts of business
condition changes are not improved, but the forecasts are much more aligned with both the
backcasts and the reality.
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Figure 10: Growth Forecasts Across Regimes
In the empirical literature of estimating monetary policy rules, there is one line of research
led by Orphanides (2004) arguing that in the pre-Volcker regime, monetary policy is too
active to poorly measured output gaps. Boivin (2006) conducts more careful analysis and
confirms the more active response to output gaps in the Pre-Volcker era.
Ideally, we should estimate the whole model in the pre-Volcker era to quantify the con-
tribution of alternative policy rules in explaining the forecasts during the pre-Volcker era.
However, this cannot be achieved because the current version of level-k DSGE does not
handle stochastic trend very well. A much less ambitious approach is to check whether the
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alternative forecast rule under alternative policy rule is also aligned with data.
Inflation vs GDP Targeting. The coefficients φpi and φy reflect the dual goals of in-
flation targeting and GDP targeting in monetary policy rules. Despite the disagreement in
empirical results, it is generally believed that φpi is lower (Clarida et al., 2000) and φpi is
higher (Orphanides, 2004) in the pre-Volcker era. Boivin (2006) adopts more sophisticated
methods, and gets (φpi,φy ) = (1.10, 0.47) before 1979q3, and (φpi,φy ) = (1.50, 0.00) after
that.
Table 3 summarizes the role of policy rules in affecting the mean reversion of output. The 4
columns correspond to the model based forecast rule, data based forecast regression, model
based unbiased expectation rule, data based auto-regression. The upper half of corresponds
to the Great Moderation period, while the lower half corresponds to the pre-Volcker era.
Table 3: Mean Reversion Across Policy Regimes
yˆ et+4|t − yˆt Et yˆt+4 − yˆt
(1.64, 0.10) 1985q1-2007q4 (1.64, 0.10) 1985q1-2007q4
yˆt −0.022 −0.008
[−0.050,0.034]
−0.250 −0.290
[−0.447,−0.133]
Obs. 88 88
R2 0.002 0.135
(1.10, 0.47) 1965q1-1979q3 (1.10, 0.47) 1965q1-1979q3
yˆt −0.092 −0.176
[−0.272,−0.079]
−0.682 −0.775
[−1.034,−0.516]
Obs. 55 55
R2 0.201 0.405
The results indicate that GDP targeting does enlarge the mean reversion of output both in
forecast and in reality. The intuition has been highlighted in Proposition 5.
Stablization Mechanism. As in Proposition 3, the current output is determined by
the nowcast of interest rate, the nowcast of output, and the forecast of output. When the
federal fund rate does not respond much to output gaps, lower interest rate raises the output
growth not through the nowcast or forecast of output, but through the nowcast of interest
rate. As a result, Taylor Rule stabilizes the economy not through making expectations
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mean reverting, but through making the economic outcomes much more mean reverting
than expectations.
1.6.3. Great Recession
Missing Deflation. Under rational expectations, permanent negative demand gaps can
make deflation explode. This implies that strong deflation would be observed if the demand
gap is very persistent. In level-k DSGE, this is no longer the case.
Proposition 8. For hypothetical permanent output gap yˆperm without aggregate shocks,
pi
e,(k)
perm =(k − 1) · (1− θ)κy yˆperm,
pi
(k)
perm =k · (1− θ)κy yˆperm.
This proposition indicates that permanent output gap is compatible stable inflation. How-
ever, it does not mean that the monetary authority can permanently raise the output level.
Suppose it does, then the original inflation target can no longer be maintained, and it is no
longer innocuous to assume that households are unaware of it.
With estimated parameters, 1.0% permanent downturn generates 0.1% disinflation expecta-
tions and 0.4% disinflation. The lack of drop in inflation expectations is a fact that has been
explored by Negro et al. (2015). Level-k DSGE interprets it as the lack of deep reasoning,
instead of anything from surprise.
The observational equivalent model in Proposition 7 will produce the same size of deflation if
the output gap lasts for 4 years. Yet, that model will produce a drop of inflation expectations
to the same size of the drop of inflation, which does not happen during the Great Recession.
Stagnant Recovery Expectations. Consider an economy initially with a negative out-
put gap, and no aggregate shocks. The natural rate of interest has changed permanently by
∆rˆn, and the federal fund rate is binded at zero until the output gap becomes non-negative.
Proposition 9. Denote pˆiSS as the inflation target. When there are no exogenous shocks,
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for k ∈ [1, 2], during the liquidity trap, we have
yˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 = yˆt−1 + (s + 1)(k − 1)
ω
1− γ (pˆiSS + ∆rˆ
n).
With estimated parameters, (k−1) ω1−γ = 0.125, which indicates very slow expected recovery.
This is confirmed by Figure 11. In the figure, the average index of business condition change
after the end of 2009 is nearly the same as that before, which supports the model implication
that households do not expect strong recovery during the Great Recession.
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
year
a
gg
re
ga
te
 in
de
x
Expected Recovery
 
 
business condition change forecasts
average before 2009
average from 2009
Figure 11: Stagnant Recovery Expectations
This figure overturns the common belief that the economy would recover very fast after
the recession. If their forecasts are relevant for economic decisions, then what we need to
explain in the model is not why recovery is surprisingly slow, but whether the slow recovery
can be the consequence of pessimistic expectations.
Slow Recovery. Now consider a numerical example, in which the neutral rate of interest
in terms of discount factor drops by 1.5% permanently, and the economy starts with some
negative output gaps. Nominal interest rate is trapped as zero until output is fully recovered.
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All shocks are turned off.
As in Figure 12, the output recovery can be very slow if the natural rate of interest is low
as well, and the recovery is slower if the initial output gap is larger.
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Figure 12: Slow Recovery
Proposition 3 and 9 jointly provide the intuition why the recovery can be so lower. In
both propositions, planning horizon plays a very important role. According to Proposition
9, given a long period of lower interest rate stimulus, households would expect very strong
recovery if γ is close to one. According to Proposition 3, given some expectations of recovery,
large negative output gap cannot be sustained if γ is close to one.
1.6.4. Forward Guidance
Amplifying or Dampening. Similar to Farhi and Werning (2017), the initial response
of output to an interest rate shock in future will be dampened by level-k. However, due to
the different specification of level-0, the effects of monetary shocks are accumulated across
time. The ultimate effect of forward guidance may not be small. It just takes a while to
fully realize.
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Policy Experiment. Now consider a thought experiment that the t + τ period interest
rate expectation is shocked by −1 percentage point. All other shocks are turned off. Interest
rates are pegged before the shock, and follow the Taylor Rule otherwise.
Proposition 10. Under this environment, for k ∈ [1, 2] and s ∈ [0, τ − 1] ∩ N,
yˆ
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 =yˆt−1 − (k − 1)ω
γτ−s−1 − γτ+1
1− γ rˆ
e,(k)
t+τ |t−1,
pˆi
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 =(k − 1)κyˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1.
Figure 13 plots the dynamic effects of forward guidance with a −1% shock in interest rate
at 1-10 years horizons. The results indicate that forward guidance at shorter horizons have
larger initial responses, but those at longer horizons can have larger cumulative effects.
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Figure 13: Horizon Effect of Forward Guidance
This result implies that forward guidance can be effective only if the central bank keeps the
announcement for a while and if the announcement is too far away in the future, it will be
very difficult to detect its effect empirically.
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1.7. Conclusion
This paper establishes a level-k DSGE framework for monetary policy analysis. A recursive
level-k equilibrium is established to handle endogenous state variables, and incomplete
markets are introduce to discipline households’ planning horizons, as well as guarantee
eductive stability. The framework is easy to use and has transparent mechanisms.
The model structure and expectation data help identify parameter k. The interaction
between households and firms allows us to use output growth and inflation expectations to
separate direct and indirect transmission channels. The expectation data support the model
implication that indirect channels are missing, while direct channels are weak in households’
forecast rules. The formal evidence identifies k ∈ [1, 2], while the later evidence identifies
the exact value of k . Level-k also has data supported implications different from limited
attention.
The model performance is evaluated under four alternative monetary policies. Under the
Taylor Rule during the Great Moderation, the model well captures the impulse response
functions to federal fund rate shocks, and is observationally equivalent to a rational ex-
pectations model with external habit, working capital loans and very sticky marginal cost
production in terms of output and inflation dynamics. In the pre-Volcker era, the more
active GDP targeting rule can partially explain why growth forecasts are more aligned with
the backcasts. In the Great Recession, when interest rate is trapped at zero, the model can
explain the both the missing deflation, and the missing drop in inflation expectations. It
also well captures the stagnant recovery expectations as in the data, and produce very slow
recovery under such expectations. Under forward guidance shock, the model is consistent
with the consensus that the initial response should be small, but also indicates that forward
guidance can be effective if the announcement is kept for a few quarters.
There are still a few related research questions worth further exploring. First, planning
horizon has larger effects on equilibrium dynamics under non-rational expectations, but
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it is still not clear under what general conditions, this part should be explicitly specified.
Second, the dual dynamic beauty contests in this paper only provides an example to separate
direct and indirect effects in expectation data. Wage stickiness will add one more beauty
contest, and provides sharper views for inflation. Third, reasoning in terms of real variables
actually involves some level of rationality. The level-k model can be used to deal with this
issue by initializing level-0 with nominal anchors. Forth, the level-k framework could be
applied to finance related topics in which long horizon expectations play a role, such as
bubbles and private money. I leave all these valuable questions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 : Search-Based Sticky Prices
2.1. Introduction
Demand creates its own supply in New Keynesian models represented by Christiano et al.
(2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) through the following two channels. First, due to
price rigidity, firms produce more when they charge a price markup lower than the desired
level. Second, due to wage rigidity, households supply more labor when wage markup is
lower.
However, the first channel is at odd with recent empirical findings. Nekarda and Ramey
(2013) uses inverse labor share to measure price markup, finding that it is procyclical in ag-
gregate level, and acyclical in industry level data, conditional on both government spending
and monetary shocks. Kim (2016) uses energy data, and finds that price markup is pro-
cyclical conditional on government spending shocks in industry level data. Hall (2014) uses
advertising, and shows that price markup should be procyclical unconditionally. Motivated
by these results, we would like to ask one question: can we build a sticky price model1
which does not rely on countercyclical price markup for demand shock transmission, and
performs no worse than New Keynesian models in all other aspects?
In our paper, we extend the Dixit-Stiglitz framework by introducing shopping frictions.
Households have to find varieties and they never find all available varieties. Firms’ locations
(of which each has a measure one) and households’ search efforts look for each other and
meet according to a matching function. A competitive search protocol determines the
coordination of firms and households. An increase in demand is implemented via an increase
in the number of varieties and in the amount of each variety. More matches between
households and firms increase the occupancy rates and with it productivity and markup
1Phaneuf et al. (2016) finds that markup can be turned procyclical conditional on monetary shocks when
firms have to take loans to pay their inputs, and this channel can be quantitatively important if firms have
to purchase inputs from each other. This feature also exists in Christiano et al. (2005). However, this
approach does not answer the question we ask because the financial cost is a supply side channel, and does
not generate a procyclical inverse labor share.
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become procyclical conditional on demand shocks.
Our shopping friction extends Huo and R´ıos-Rull (2013) by allowing for competitive search
in a New Keynesian environment and this is our major theoretical contribution2. First, we
propose an additional tightness concern for firms’ pricing decision. Higher price reduces
not only the quantity of demand for each matched household, but also the probability of
matching between firms and households. Second, the elasticities of the matching function
with respect to the market tightness are naturally time varying and countercyclical when
the matching probability has an upper bound. As a result, the tightness concern will be
less important when demand is higher and the market is tighter. Third, this generates a
procyclical desired price markup conditional on demand shocks. Forth, inflation goes up
when the realized price markup is lower than the desired one, and the price markup can be
higher than the steady state level if it is only sightly below the desired one. Fifth, we can
shut down the shopping friction by simply setting the related parameters to some values,
so that we can allow the data to decide how important our shopping friction is.
In order to demonstrate how it works, we first introduce this shopping friction to a Rotem-
berg version of the off-the-shelf New Keynesian model taken from Gal´ı (2015). This simple
model has all mechanisms we want but still cannot generate procyclical price markup con-
ditional on monetary shocks quantitatively, because the wage response is unrealistically too
large. This is an issue that many business cycle models have to deal with, and we do not
intend to solve it.
In the future, we will apply this framework in a medium scale DSGE model, and estimate
it to quantify the role of search-based sticky prices.
2.2. Shopping Friction in an Off-the-shelf Model
We start by introducing the shopping friction to a off-the-shelf New Keynesian model taken
from Gal´ı (2015). For convinience, we define the model recursively, and use Rotemberg
2Michaillat and Saez (2015) also points out that inflation dynamics can be modeled using competitive
search.
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pricing instead of Calvo pricing. We explore how the model works theoretically in this
section.
2.2.1. Environment
There is a measure one of varieties of goods, and each one is produced by one firm. Such a
firm has a measure one of productive locations. Households like varieties via a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator but in order to purchase a variety, it has to exert some effort to find it. Each
Household can send search effort to all submarkets, but each firm can only go to one of
these submarkets. Firms also sell goods in a market where only other firms can go (more
details later). On top of this, firms face adjustment costs to price changes and a central
bank pursues its monetary policy as in standard New Keynesian models.
Submarkets are indexed by the price of the goods and the market tightness {p, q}. The
market tightness q of a submarket is its measure of search effort D(p, q) relative to its
measure of firms or varieties J(p, q), i.e. q = D(p, q)/J(p, q). The number of matches in
a submarket is determined by a matching function ψ(D(p, q), J(p, q)) with constant return
to scale. For a firm the probability that any of its locations is matched to a shopper
is ψf (q) = ψ(q, 1). For a unit of search effort the probability that it finds a variety is
ψh(q) = ψ(1, 1/q) = ψf (q)/q. Households do not find the same variety twice.
2.2.2. Households
Decisions There is a measure one of infinitely lived households that shop in a set Φ of
available submarkets. The representative household chooses (a) c(p, q): goods purchased
from each of the varieties it finds in (p, q) ∈ Φ, (b) d(p, q): total shopping effort allocated
to (p, q) ∈ Φ, (c) `: labor, and (d) b′: one-period zero-coupon bond.
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Preference A household finds d(p, q)ψh(q) varieties, and get utility u(cA, dA, `) where
cA ≡
(∫
d(p, q)ψh(q)c(p, q)
ε−1
ε dpdq
) ε
ε−1
, with ε > 1,
dA ≡
∫
d(p, q)dpdq.
States and equilibrium objects The Aggregate state S = {θ, p−} consists of shocks
and the previous period price level. The individual state also includes b, nominal bonds of
which there are zero in net supply. We are looking for a few equilibrium objects (a) the
set Φ(S) of submarkets with economic activity, (b) the profits from all firms Πf (S), (c) the
nominal wage rate W (S), (d) the one-period forward nominal gross interest rate R(S), (e)
law of motion for aggregate states H(S , θ′). In particular we will guess and verify that all
economic activity takes place in a unique market Φ(S) = {p(S), q(S)}.
Households’ problem We pose the problem of the households as if many submarkets
are available and characterize the properties that have to be satisfied for a household to
be willing to go to various submarkets. This gives a well defined problem to the firm of
which submarket to go to in a similar vein as the standard way to solve the monopolistic
competition problem.
Let the value function of households be v(S , b) and discount factor be β. We pose its
problem conditional on an arbitrary set Φ of available markets in the following recursive
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form:
V (S , b, Φ) = max
c(p,q),d(p,q),`,b′
{
u(cA, dA, `) + βE[v(S ′, b′)|S ]
}
,
s.t. e +
b′
R(S)
= W (S)`+ b + Πf (S),
S ′ = H(S , θ′),
cA =
(∫
Φ
d(p, q)ψh(q)c(p, q)
ε−1
ε dpdq
) ε
ε−1
,
dA =
∫
Φ
d(p, q)dpdq,
e =
∫
Φ
d(p, q)ψh(q)p c(p, q)dpdq.
The solution is a set of decision rules {c(p, q), d(p, q), `, cA, dA, b′} on (S , b, Φ) satisfying
first order conditions (F.O.C.s)
0 =
(
c(p, q)
cA
)− 1
ε
ucA − λp, ∀p, q ∈ Φ
0 =
ε
ε− 1
(
c(p, q)
cA
)− 1
ε
ucA +
udA
ψh(q)c(p, q)
− λp, ∀p, q ∈ Φ
0 = u` + λW (S),
0 = E[vb(S ′, b′)|S ]− λ
R(S)
.
Which submarkets to go Given {p, q} ∈ Φ, households would go to submarket {p, q}
only if
ψh(q) =
(
p
p
)ε−1
ψh(q).
This condition implies that households are not willing to purchase any of the varieties
if the price and market tightness combination is not satisfactory. It is a property from
the shopping technology that the total measure of varieties that a household can find is
proportional to the total shopping effort it exerts. As a result, a household only cares about
how much varieties to purchase, but not which variety to purchase. The solution for q is
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denoted as qh(S , b, {p, q}, p).
c(p, q) must satisfies
c(p, q) =
(
p
p
)−ε
c(p, q).
This implies that once a variety is found, the quantity to purchase is lower when the price
is higher. The solution for c(p, q) is denoted as c(S , b, {p, q}, p, qh(S , b, {p, q}, p)).
Degenerate submarkets If Φ = {p, q}, the FOCs collapse to
0 = ι
1
ε−1 ucA − λp,
0 =
ε
ε− 1 ι
1
ε−1 ucA +
udA
ψh(q)c(p, q, p, q)
− λp,
0 = u` + λW (S),
0 = E[vb(S ′, b′)|S ]− λ
R(S)
.
where ι = dAψh(q) is the measure of varieties that households find and therefore cA =
ι
ε
ε−1 c(p, q, p, q). Since ε > 1 implies that households like varieties.
Aggregation The degenerate submarket yields decisions as functions of state (S , b), sub-
market {p, q}, and the possibility of a different submarket {p, q} being open
• individual shopping effort aggregator: dA(S , b, {p, q}),
• individual total shopping effort d(S , b, {p, q}) = dA(S , b, {p, q}),
• individual total measure of varieties: ι(S , b, {p, q}) = dA(S , b, {p, q}) ψh(q),
• individual consumption of each variety it finds: c(S , b, {p, q})
• individual consumption aggregator: cA(S , b, {p, q}) = ι(S , b, {p, q}) εε−1 c(S , b, {p, q}),
• the tightness of another submarket {p, q} that a household would be willing to go:
qh(S , b, {p, q}, p),
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• The consumption of each variety a household finds in a different submarket {p, qh(S , b, {p, q}, p)}:
c[S , b, {p, q}, p, qh(S , b, {p, q}, p)].
Imposing Representative Agent (b = 0) gives us their aggregate counterparts
• D(S , {p, q}) = DA(S , {p, q})
• I(S , {p, q}) = DA(S , {p, q}) ψh(q)
• C (S , {p, q})
• CA(S , {p, q}) = I(S , {p, q}) εε−1 C (S , {p, q})
• Qh(S , {p, q}, p)
• C [S , {p, q}, p, Qh(S , {p, q}, p)]
Last two objects are taken as given by the firms when they choose which submarket to go.
2.2.3. Firms
Production There is a measure one of infinitely lived firms. Each of them has a measure
one of locations, and produces a differentiated variety j . Firm j chooses one and the only
submarket {p, q} for all its locations and allocates workers n(p, q) to each of its locations.
Workers are hired in a centralized market at nominal wage rate W , and produce (if matched)
y(p, q) in each location using technology
y j(p, q) = θanj(p, q),
where θa is the technology level common assumed to be common across all firms.
Firm j also produce its variety for the intermediate goods market with no search frictions.
The intermediate goods are used to alleviate adjustment costs, and have to be sold at the
same price as to the households. The aggregate demand for each variety j , to be specified
later, is X (S , pj).
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Adjustment costs Firms incur price adjustment costs in units of a goods aggregate
made from varieties. Denote by x j the required adjustment costs for firm j and let x ji
be the amount of variety i that firms purchase to deal with its adjustment costs. The
aggregator is
x j =
(∫ 1
0
(
x ji
) ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
.
Adjustment costs, to be specified later, are x j = χ(S , pj−, pj).
Profits A firm j that goes to submarket (p, Qh(S , {p, q}, p)) has profits
pij(S , {p, q}, p) = p ψf
[
Qh(S , {p, q}, p)
]
C
[
S , {p, q}, p, Qh(S , {p, q}, p)
]
+ pX (S , p)−W (S)n − χ(S , p−, p),
for some equilibrium consumption demand function C (S , Φ, p, q) and investment demand
function X (S , p). It transfers all profits pij(S , {p, q}, p) to the households.
Firms have a production requirement:
C [S , {p, q}, p, Qh(S , {p, q}, p)] + X (S , p) = θan.
Firms’ problem The firm solves
Ω(S , p−) = max
p
p {ψf [Qh(S , {p, q}, p)] C [S , {p, q}, p, Qh(S , {p, q}, p)] + X (S , p)}
− W (S)
θa
{C [S , {p, q}, p, Qh(S , {p, q}, p)] + X (S , p)}− χ(S , p−, p) +E[Λ(S , S ′) Ω(S ′p)|S ]}
s.t. S ′ = H(S , θ′), where Λ(S , S ′) is the stochastic discount factor specified later.
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In shorthand notations,
Ω(S , p−) = max
p
p {ψf [Qh(p)] C [p, Qh(p)] + X (p)}
− W
θa
{C [p, Qh(p)] + X (p)} − χ(S , p−, p) + E[Λ′ Ω(S ′p)|S ].
Demand and tightness functions The households’ optimal consumption and shopping
decisions imply that
ψf [Qh(p)]
Qh(p)
=
(
p
p
)ε−1 ψf [Qh(p)]
Qh(p)
,
C [p, Qh(p)] =
(
p
p
)−ε
C [p, Qh(p)].
Denote E(q) = qψfq(q)/ψf (q), these two conditions imply that
pQhp (p)
Qh(p)
= − ε− 1
1− E [Qh(p)] ,
pCp[p, Q
h(p)]
C [p, Qh(p)]
= −ε,
CQh [p, Q
h(p)] = 0.
The monopolistic competitiion in the markets for adjustment cost implies that
pXp(p)
X (p)
= −ε.
Optimal pricing With all elasticities in hand, the optimal price p satisfies an implicit
function
χp(S , p−, p)
C [p, Qh(p)] + X (p)
= ε
[
W (S)
θap
− ε− 1
ε
(
X (p)
C [p, Qh(p)] + X (p)
+
ψf [Qh(p)]
1− E [Qh(p)]
C [p, Qh(p)]
C [p, Qh(p)] + X (p)
)]
+ E
{
Λ(S , S ′)Ωp−(S ′, p)
C [p, Qh(p)] + X (p)
}
.
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The solution is an expression for p that depends on (S , p−, {p, q}) through C [p, Qh(p)] and
Qh(p).
Phillips Curve Consider a fixed point problem
p = p(S , p−, {p, q}),
q = Qh(S , {p, q}, p).
The solution is a pair of equilibrium price and markup tightness {p(S), Q(S)} satisfying
χp(S , p−, p(S))
C (S) + X (S)
= ε
[
W (S)
θap(S)
− ε− 1
ε
(
X (S)
C (S) + X (S)
+
ψf [Q(S)]
1− E [Q(S)]
C (S)
C (S) + X (S)
)]
− E
{
Λ(S , S ′)
χp−(S
′, p(S), p(S ′))
C (S) + X (S)
}
.
Choose a functional form of χ such that
χ(S , p−, p) = p(S) · κp
2
(
p
p−
− Π
)2
[C (S) + X (S)],
and use the following notations
Π(S) =
p(S)
p−
,
φp(S) =
κp
2
(
Π(S)− Π)2 ,
Y(S) = C (S) + X (S),
The Phillips Curve can be simplified to
(Π(S)− Π)Π(S) = ε
κp
{
W (S)
θap(S)
− ε− 1
ε
[
φp(S) +
(1− φp(S))ψf [Q(S)]
1− E [Q(S)]
]}
+ E
{
Λ(S , S ′)Π(S ′)
Y(S ′)
Y(S) (Π(S
′)− Π)Π(S ′)
}
,
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where Y(S) is the production capacity, instead of the realized output.
2.2.4. Monetary policy
The monetary policy is a one-period forward nominal interest rate
R =
Π
β
(
Π
Π
)rpi (Y
Y
)ry
θm,
where θm is an exogenous process of monetary shocks.
2.2.5. Equilibrium
Definition 4. The equilibrium is a set of decision rules for the household {c(p, q), d(p, q), l , b′}
as functions of (S , b, Φ) and value function v as functions of (S , b), the firms’ decision rules
and values {p, x(p), Ω} as functions of (S , p−), and aggregate functions {C , D, L, B ′, P, Π, N,Y, X , Πf , Q, W , R, H(·, θ′)}
on S such that
1. {c(p, q), d(p, q), l , b′, v} solve the households’ problem,
2. {p, x(p), Ω} solve the firms’ problem,
3. shopping decisions are consistent with market tightness,
4. individual decisions are consistent with aggregate functions,
5. monetary policy follows the specified rule, and
6. all market clears.
We show the simplifed equilibrium conditions in the appendix.
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2.2.6. Characterization
Time varying tightness concern Recall the condition that characterizes the tightness
concern
pQhp (p)
Qh(p)
= − ε− 1
1− E [Qh(p)] .
This condition implies that the elasticity of firms’ matching probability with respect to price
is
pψfq(Q
h(p))Qhp (p)
ψf (Qh(p))
=
Qh(p)ψfq(Q
h(p))
ψf (Qh(p))
pQhp (p)
Qh(p)
= −(ε− 1) E [Q
h(p)]
1− E [Qh(p)] .
When E [Qh(p)] is strictly decreasing in Qh(p), higher demand implies higher level of
Qh(p(S)), which again implies a less important tightness concern in firms’ pricng decision.
Procyclical desired price markup We define the desired price markup as the hypo-
thetical one as if price is flexible, i.e. κp = 0. Then, we can get a equilibrium condition
0 =
W (S)
θap(S)
− ε− 1
ε
ψf (Q(S))
1− E(Q(S)) .
Now the markup defined as a ratio between total profit and total cost3 is
τ(S) =
θap(S)ψf (Q(S))
W (S)
− 1 = ε
ε− 1[1− E(Q(S))]− 1.
Since Q(S) is procyclical conditional on demand shocks, the desired markup τ(S) is also
procyclical.
Inflation and price markup When κp > 0, we still use τ(S) to denote the equilibrium
markup, and the Phillips Curve implies that inflation is approximately drive by
W (S)
θap(S)
− ε− 1
ε
ψf (Q(S))
1− E(Q(S)) = ψ
f (Q(S))
[
1
(1 + τ(S))θa
− ε− 1
ε
1
1− E(Q(S))
]
.
3Since the production is Cobb-Douglas, we do not have to consider the difference bewteen level based
price markup and the margin based price markup.
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This implies that if E(Q(S)) is acyclical, procyclical τ(S) necessarily implies countercyclical
inflation. This would not happen if E(Q(S)) is sufficiently countercyclical.
The no shopping limit Impose (ψf , E) = (1, 0), and we will be able to turn off the
shopping friction in the Phllips Curve. Then, the Phillips Curve reduces to
(Π(S)− Π)Π(S) = ε
κp
{
W (S)
θap(S)
− ε− 1
ε
}
+ E
{
Λ(S , S ′)Π(S ′)
Y(S ′)
Y(S) (Π(S
′)− Π)Π(S ′)
}
,
This is identical to the one in the off-the-shelf model. Consider a GHH utility function
u(cA, dA, `) =
1
1− ω
(
cA − ζ (d
A)1+ν
1 + ν
)1−ω
− η `
1+ξ
1 + ξ
.
The limit can be achieved if and only if (ζ, ν) goes to (0, +∞).
The wage issue The off-the-shelf model still cannot generate procyclical price markup
because the wealth effect of labor requires a strongly procyclical real wage. We do not
intend to deal with this issue. Our purpose is to demonstrate the mechanisms that are
at play. These mechanisms will be able to induce what we want in a medium size DSGE
model.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Proofs
A.1.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose b(k)(ζ, 0, S) > 0, Assumption 2 implies that b(k)(1, 0, S) < 0.
Consider households’ budget c(k)(ζ, 0, S) = W (k)(S) + D(k)(S)− b(k)(ζ, 0, S).
We must have c(k)(ζ, 0, S) < c(k)(1, 0, S).
This is contradictory to the concavity of perceived and actual value functions.
A.1.2. Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. In the recursive level-k equilibrium, output satisfies
yˆ
(k)
t = (1− γ)
+∞∑
s=0
γs yˆ
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 − ω
+∞∑
s=0
γs(rˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 − pˆi
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 + Et−1η
d
t+s), (A.1)
where γ = 1−
√
λζ|1ζ
λζ|1ζ+1−λζ|1
.
Consider a perfect foresighted optimization problem. With common income yˆt+1, the lin-
earized consumption of a just constrained household i in period t + 1 satisfies
cˆconi ,t+1 = aˆ
unc
i ,t+1 + yˆt+1. (A.2)
Denote λ = λζ|1ζ. The consumption of an unconstrained household i in period t satisfies
cˆunci ,t = (1− λ)cˆunci ,t+1 + λcˆconi ,t+1 − ω(ηdt + rˆt − pˆit+1). (A.3)
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aˆunci ,t+1 for unconstrained household i satisfies
aˆunci ,t+1 = aˆi ,t − cˆunci ,t + yˆt . (A.4)
Combining equation (A.2)(A.3)(A.4) yields
(1 + λ)cˆunci ,t = (1− λ)cˆunci ,t+1 + λ(aˆi ,t + yˆt + yˆt+1)− ω(ηdt + rˆt − pˆit+1). (A.5)
Use guess and verify approach to find the expression of cˆunci ,t
cˆunci ,t = ιaaˆi ,t + ι0yˆt +
+∞∑
s=0
γs [ιy yˆt+s − ιrω(ηdt+s + rˆt+s − pˆit+1+s)].
cˆunci ,t+1 for households unconstrained in period t satisfies
cˆunci ,t+1 = ιa(aˆi ,t + yˆt − cˆunci ,t ) + ι0yˆt+1 +
+∞∑
s=0
γs [ιy yˆt+1+s − ιrω(ηdt+1+s + rˆt+1+s − pˆit+2+s)].
Compare the coefficient of aˆt in equation (A.5) to get ιa
(1 + λ)ιa = (1− λ)ιa(1− ι`ιa) + λ =⇒ ιa =
√
λ
1 +
√
λ
.
Compare the coefficient of {yˆt , yˆt+2, yˆt+1} in equation (A.5) to get ι0 + ιy , γ and ιy
(1 + λ)(ι0 + ιy ) = (1− λ)ιa(1− ι0 − ιy ) + λ =⇒ ι0 + ιy = ιa.
(1 + λ)γ2ιy = (1− λ)(−ιaγ2ιy + γιy ) =⇒ γ = 1−
√
λ.
(1 + λ)γιy = (1− λ)(−ιaγιy + ι0 + ιy ) + λ =⇒ ιy = γ−1(ι0 + ιy ).
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Compare coefficients on ηdt + rˆt − pˆit+1 in equation (A.5) to get ιr
−(1 + λ)ιrω = (1− λ)ιaιrω − ω =⇒ ιr = 1− (ι0 + ιy ).
In the equilibrium, we have yˆt = cˆ
unc
i ,t and aˆi ,t = 0 and then
yˆt = (1− γ)
+∞∑
s=0
γs yˆt+1+s − ω
+∞∑
s=0
γs(ηdt+s + rˆt+s − pˆit+1+s).
Now, impose level-k on it and obtain
yˆ
(k)
t = (1− γ)
+∞∑
s=0
γs yˆ
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 − ω
+∞∑
s=0
γs(rˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 − pˆi
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1 + Et−1η
d
t+s).
A.1.3. Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. In the recursive level-k equilibrium, inflation satisfies
pˆi
(k)
t =(1− θ)
+∞∑
s=0
θs((1− θ)κy yˆ e,(k)t+s|t−1 + pˆi
e,(k)
t+s|t−1)− κz
1− θ
1− θρz η
z
t ,
where (κy ,κz) =
(
1−α
α ε− (1− α)(ε− 1), 1−αα ε+ 1
)
.
The optimal price satisfies
pˆat =(1− θ)
+∞∑
s=0
θs
s∑
τ=0
pˆi
e,(k)
t+τ |t−1 + (1− θ)
+∞∑
s=0
θs(κy yˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 − κzEt−1ηzt+s)
=(1− θ)
+∞∑
τ=0
+∞∑
s=τ
θs pˆi
e,(k)
t+τ |t−1 + (1− θ)
+∞∑
s=0
θs(κy yˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 − κzEt−1ηzt+s)
=
+∞∑
s=0
θs pˆi
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 + (1− θ)
+∞∑
s=0
θs(κy yˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 − κzEt−1ηzt+s).
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According to the price aggregator,
pˆit = (1− θ)pˆat .
A.1.4. Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5. The expected cumulative effect of interest rate is,
+∞∑
s=0
γs rˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 =
1
1− γρr
[
ρr rˆt−1 + (1− ρr )
+∞∑
s=0
γs(φpipˆi
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 + φy yˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1)
]
.
The interest rate forecast satisfies
rˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 =ρr rˆ
e,(k)
t+s−1|t−1 + (1− ρr )(φpipˆi
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 + φy yˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1) + σrEt−1
r
t+s|t−1
=ρs+1r rˆt−1 + (1− ρr )
s∑
τ=0
ρτr (φpipˆi
e,(k)
t+s−τ |t−1 + φy yˆ
e,(k)
t+s−τ |t−1) + σr
s∑
τ=0
ρτr Et−1rt+s−τ
=ρs+1r rˆt−1 + (1− ρr )
s∑
τ=0
ρs−τr (φpipˆit+τ |t−1 + φy yˆt+τ |t−1) + σr
s∑
τ=0
ρs−τr Et−1rt+τ .
Use the following identity
+∞∑
s=0
γs
s∑
τ=0
ρs−τr =
+∞∑
s=0
s∑
τ=0
γsρs−τr =
+∞∑
τ=0
+∞∑
s=τ
γsρs−τr
=
1
1− γρr
+∞∑
τ=0
γτ =
1
1− γρr
+∞∑
s=0
γs .
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The cumulative effect of interest rate forecasts becomes
+∞∑
s=0
γs rˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1
=
+∞∑
s=0
γs
[
ρs+1r rˆt−1 + (1− ρr )
s∑
τ=0
ρs−τr (φpipˆi
e,(k)
t+τ |t−1 + φy yˆ
e,(k)
t+τ |t−1) + σr
s∑
τ=0
ρs−τr Et−1rt+τ
]
=
1
1− γρr
[
ρr rˆt−1 + (1− ρr )
+∞∑
s=0
γs(φpipˆi
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 + φy yˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1) + σr
+∞∑
s=0
γsEt−1rt+s
]
.
A.1.5. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 can be proved by combining Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5.
A.1.6. Proof of Corollary 1
Change all time index t to t + 1 in equation (A.1) and forecast it based on period t − 1
information.
yˆ
(k)
t+1 = (1− γ)
+∞∑
s=0
γs yˆ
e,(k)
(t+2+s|t)|t−1 − ω
+∞∑
s=0
γs(rˆ
e,(k)
(t+1+s|t)|t−1 − pˆi
e,(k)
(t+2+s|t)t−1 + Et−1η
d
t+1+s),(A.6)
Combine equation (A.1) and (A.6), and we can get it.
A.1.7. Proof of Proposition 3
Follow Proposition 2 directly.
A.1.8. Proof of Lemma 2
Set ρr = φpi = η
d = ηz = 0 in Proposition 3, and we can get
yˆ
(k)
t = −ωφy yˆ e,(k)t|t−1 +
(
1− ωγ
1− γφy
)
(1− γ)
+∞∑
s=0
γs yˆ
e,(k)
t+1+s|t−1. (A.7)
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Since the only state variable now is yˆt−1, and it must converge the 0 in the long run, the
law of motion becomes yˆ
(k)
t = ρˆ
(k)
y yˆt−1. When k ∈ [1, +∞)∩N, the perceived law of motion
becomes yˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1 = (ρ
e,(k)
y )s+1yˆt−1 = (ρ
(k−1)
y )s+1yˆt−1.
Substituting the actual and perceived law of motion back to equation (A.7) yields Lemma
2.
A.1.9. Proof of Proposition 4
When |ρ(k−1)y | ≤ 1, ρ
(k)
y
ρ
(k−1)
y
is monotonic in ρ
(k−1)
y . Hence, we only need to check the bounds.
When ρ
(k−1)
y = 1, eductive stability requires
ρ
(k)
y
ρ
(k−1)
y
= 1− ω
1− γφy > −1 =⇒ γ < 1−
1
2
ωφy .
When ρ
(k−1)
y = −1, eductive stability requires
ρ
(k)
y
ρ
(k−1)
y
= −ωφy −
(
1− ωγ
1− γφy
)
1− γ
1 + γ
= −1− γ
1 + γ
− ω
1 + γ
φy > −1 =⇒ γ > 1
2
ωφy .
Once these conditions are satisfied, | ρ
(k)
y
ρ
(k−1)
y
| ≤ M for M = max
{
|1− ω1−γφy |, 1−γ1+γ + ω1+γφy
}
.
A.1.10. Proof of Proposition 5
Base on the initialization of level-0, we have
yˆ
e,(1)
t|t−1 = yˆt−1, pˆi
e,(1)
t|t−1 = 0.
This implies that in He,(1), output is full anchored. Hence,
yˆ
e,(1)
t+s|t−1 = yˆt−1.
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Applied this output forecasts in Proposition 2, we get
yˆ
e,(2)
t|t−1 − yˆt−1 =ω
(
− 1− ρr
1− γρr
φy
1− γ yˆt−1 −
ρr
1− γρr rˆt−1 −
1
1− γρd η
d
t
)
,
pˆi
e,(2)
t|t−1 =κ
(
yˆt−1 − ω 1− θ
1− θρz η
z
t
)
.
For k ∈ [1, 2], (yˆ e,(k)t|t−1, pˆi
e,(k)
t|t−1) = (2− k)(yˆ
e,(1)
t|t−1, pˆi
e,(1)
t|t−1) + (k − 1)(yˆ
e,(2)
t|t−1, pˆi
e,(2)
t|t−1).
A.1.11. Proof of Corollary 2
When ηdt = η
z
t = 0 and k ∈ [1, 2], the perceived aggregate law of motion becomesyˆ e,(k)t|t−1
rˆ
e,(k)
t|t−1
 =
 1 −(k − 1) ωρr1−γρr
(k − 1)(1− ρr )[(1− θ)(ω−1 + ξ−1)φpi + φy ] ρr − (k − 1) ωρr1−γρr (1− ρr )φy

yˆt−1
rˆt−1
 .
Denote the perceived law of motion as hˆe,(k), then
yˆ e,(k)t+s|t−1
rˆ
e,(k)
t+s|t−1
 = (hˆe,(k))s+1
yˆt−1
rˆt−1
 .
Hence, yˆ
e,(k)
t+3|t−1 can be obtained directly, and pˆi
e,(k)
t+3|t−1 can be obtained from
pˆi
e,(k)
t+3|t−1 = (k − 1)κyˆ
e,(k)
t+2|t−1.
A.1.12. Proof of Proposition 6 and Proposition 8
Following Proposition 2 directly.
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A.1.13. Proof of Proposition 7
Consider an external habit model with no uncertainty
yˆt − yˆt−1 =1− wyss(1− ω)
h
(yˆt+1 − yˆt)− 1− h
h
ω(rˆt − pˆit+1),
pˆit =
(1− θ)(1− βf θ)
θ
[
ψ
(
1
1− h yˆt −
h
1− h yˆt−1
)
+ rˆt
]
+ pˆit+1,
rˆt =ρr rˆt−1 + (1− ρr )(φpipˆit + φy yˆt).
Suppose the actual law of motion is identical to the level-k model, then
Γys,(k) − Γy =1− wyss(1− ω)
h
(Γys,(k) − Γy )Γss,(k) − 1− h
h
ω(Γr − Γpis,(k))Γss,(k),
Γpis,(k) =
(1− θ)(1− βf θ)
θ
[
ψ
(
1
1− h Γ
ys,(k) − h
1− h Γ
y
)
+ Γrs,(k)
]
+ βf Γ
pis,(k)Γss,(k).
The new set of parameters can be solved as
[
1−wyss(1−ω)
h
1−h
h ω
]
=(Γys,(k) − Γy )(Γss,(k))−1
Γys,(k) − Γy
Γpis,(k) − Γr

−1
,
[
(1−θ)(1−βf θ)
θ ψ
(1−θ)(1−βf θ)
θ
]
=Γpis,(k)(I− βf Γss,(k))
 11−hΓys,(k) − h1−hΓy
Γrs,(k)

−1
.
A.1.14. Proof of Proposition 9
When nominal interest rate becomes zero, it declines piSS compared to the original steady
state. As the natural rate of interest changes by rˆn, the interest rate gap becomes rˆt =
−(piSS + rˆn) in the liquidity trap. Neither level-0 nor level-1 households react to expectations
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on future.
yˆ
e,(2)
t+s|t−1 =yˆt−1 + (s + 1)
ω
1− γ (pˆiSS + rˆ
n),
pˆi
e,(2)
t+s|t−1 =κyˆ
e,(2)
t−1+s|t−1.
For k ∈ [1, 2], (yˆ e,(k)t|t−1, pˆi
e,(k)
t|t−1) = (2− k)(yˆ
e,(1)
t|t−1, pˆi
e,(1)
t|t−1) + (k − 1)(yˆ
e,(2)
t|t−1, pˆi
e,(2)
t|t−1).
A.1.15. Proof of Proposition 10
The proof is identical to Proposition 9 except that
yˆ
e,(2)
t+1+s|t−1 = yˆt−1 − ω
s+1∑
ν=0
γτ−ν rˆ e,(k)t+τ |t−1 = yˆt−1 − ω
γτ−s−1 − γτ+1
1− γ rˆ
e,(k)
t+τ |t−1.
A.2. Solving the Model with Endogenous Labor Supply
The standard solution procedure for rational expectations DSGE models cannot be directly
applied here. Hence, it is useful to describe how to write the model into a state space form.
Use Γ to denote the coefficients in linearized equilibrium objects, and the solution procedure
can be briefly described in the following.
1. Solve for Γca,e without using equilibrium objects.
2. Initialize (Γys,e,(1), Γpis,e,(1), Γws,e,(1), Γτs,e,(1)) from level-0, and obtain Γss,e,(1).
3. Solve for Γcs,e,(1) from the perceived households’ problem.
4. Solve for (Γys,(1), Γ`s,(1), Γws,(1), Γτs,(1)) from the temporary equilibrium.
5. Solve for Γpis,(1) from the firms’ problem, and obtain Γss,(1).
6. Use (Γys,e,(j+1), Γpis,e,(j+1), Γws,e,(j+1), Γτs,e,(j+1)) = (Γys,(j), Γpis,(j), Γws,(j), Γτs,(j)) to up-
date.
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7. Obtain the state space representation.
A.2.1. Step 1: Solve for Γca,e
Log-linearizing the optimality conditions for the constrained households yields
ω−1cˆe(ζ) =wˆ e − ξ−1 ˆ`e(ζ),
cˆe(ζ) =aˆ + wySS(wˆ
e + τˆ e + ˆ`e(ζ)).
(Γca,e(ζ), Γ`a,e(ζ)) can be obtained from
ω−1 ξ−1
1 −wySS

Γca,e(ζ)
Γ`a,e(ζ)
 =
0
1
 .
The solution is Γca,e(ζ) = 1
1+ξω−1wySS
.
The unconstrained households have
cˆe(1) =− ω(ηd + rˆ e − pˆie ′) + λcˆe ′(1) + (1− λ)cˆe ′(ζ),
aˆe ′(1) =(RSS/ΠSS)[aˆ + wySS(wˆ e + τˆ e + ˆ`e(1))− cˆe(1)],
ˆ`e(1) =ξwˆ e − ξω−1cˆe(1).
(Γca,e(1), Γ`a,e(1), Γaa,e(1)) satisfy
Γca,e(1) =[λΓca,e(1) + (1− λ)Γca,e(ζ)]Γaa,e(1),
Γaa,e(1) =(RSS/ΠSS)(1 + wySSΓ
`a,e(1)− Γca,e(1)),
Γ`a,e(1) =− ξω−1Γca,e(1).
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This yields a quadratic function for Γca,e(1)
(ΠSS/RSS)Γ
ca,e(1) =[λΓca,e(1) + (1− λ)Γca,e(ζ)][1− (1 + ξω−1wySS)Γca,e(1)].
Solving λ from Γca,e(1) yields
λ =
Γca,e(ζ)− Γca,e(1) (ΠSS/RSS )
1−(1+ξω−1wySS )Γca,e(1)
Γca,e(ζ)− Γca,e(1) .
The notation λ = λ1
λ1+(1−λ1)ζ yields
λ1 = [1 + (λ
−1 − 1)ζ−1]−1.
The fraction of hand-to-mouth households λHtM satisfies
λHtM =(1− λ1)/(2− λ1 − λ2),
λ2 =1− (1− λ1)(1− λHtM)/λHtM .
A.2.2. Step 2: Initialize (Γys,e,(1), Γpis,e,(1), Γws,e,(1), Γτs,e,(1)) and Γss,e,(1)
Specify the level-1 expectations.
Γys,e,(1)sˆ =yˆ−,
Γpis,e,(1)sˆ =0,
Γ`s,e,(1)sˆ =yˆ− − ηz ,
Γws,e,(1) =ω−1Γys,e,(1) + ξ−1Γ`s,e,(1),
Γτs,e,(1) =wy−1SS Γ
ys,e,(1) − Γ`s,e,(1) − Γws,e,(1).
71
According to the perceived Taylor Rule,
Γrs,e,(1) = ρrΓ
r + (1− ρr )(φpiΓpis,e,(1) + φyΓys,e,(1)).
The state variable is sˆ = (yˆ−, rˆ−, ηd , ηz). Γss,e,(1) can be obtained from (Γys,e,(1), Γrs,e,(1))
and the exogenous law of motion for (ηd , ηz).
A.2.3. Step 3: Solve for Γcs,e,(1)
Recall the optimality conditions of the constrained households
ω−1cˆe(ζ) =wˆ e − ξ−1 ˆ`e(ζ),
cˆe(ζ) =aˆ + wySS(wˆ
e + τˆ e + ˆ`e(ζ)).
(Γcs,e,(1)(ζ), Γ`s,e,(1)(ζ)) can be obtained from
ω−1 ξ−1
1 −wySS

Γcs,e,(1)(ζ)
Γ`s,e,(1)(ζ)
 =
 Γws,e,(1)
wySS(Γ
ws,e,(1) + Γτs,e,(1))
 .
Recall the optimality conditions of the unconstrained households
cˆe(1) =− ω(ηd + rˆ e − pˆie ′) + λcˆe ′(1) + (1− λ)cˆe ′(ζ),
aˆe ′(1) =(RSS/ΠSS)[aˆ + wySS(wˆ e + τˆ e + ˆ`e(1))− cˆe(1)],
ˆ`e(1) =ξwˆ e − ξω−1cˆe(1).
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(Γcs,e,(1)(1), Γ`s,e,(1)(1), Γas,e,(1)(1)) satisfy
Γcs,e,(1)(1) =− ω(Γds + Γrs,e,(1) − Γpis,e,(1)Γss,e,(1))
+ [λΓca,e,(1)(1) + (1− λ)Γca,e,(1)(ζ)]Γas,e,(1)(1),
+ [λΓcs,e,(1)(1) + (1− λ)Γcs,e,(1)(ζ)]Γss,e,(1),
Γas,e,(1)(1) =(RSS/ΠSS)[wySS(Γ
ws,e,(1) + Γτs,e,(1) + Γ`s,e,(1)(1))− Γcs,e,(1)(1)],
Γ`s,e,(1)(1) =ξΓws,e,(1) − ξω−1Γcs,e,(1)(1).
Eliminate (Γ`s,e,(1)(1), Γas,e,(1)(1)) to obtain a single equation of Γcs,e,(1)(1)
Γcs,e,(1)(1) =− ω(Γds + Γrs,e,(1) − Γpis,e,(1)Γss,e,(1))
+ [λΓca,e,(1)(1) + (1− λ)Γca,e,(1)(ζ)]
· (RSS/ΠSS){wySS [(1 + ξ)Γws,e,(1) + Γτs,e,(1)]− (1 + ξω−1wySS)Γcs,e,(1)(1)},
+ [λΓcs,e,(1)(1) + (1− λ)Γcs,e,(1)(ζ)]Γss,e,(1).
The solution for Γcs,e,(1)(1) is
Γcs,e,(1)(1) ={(RSS/ΠSS)wySS [λΓca,e,(1)(1) + (1− λ)Γca,e,(1)(ζ)][(1 + ξ)Γws,e,(1) + Γτs,e,(1)]
+ (1− λ)Γcs,e,(1)(ζ)Γss,e,(1) − ω(Γds + Γrs,e,(1) − Γpis,e,(1)Γss,e,(1))}
{I+ (RSS/ΠSS)(1 + ξω−1wySS)[λΓca,e,(1)(1) + (1− λ)Γca,e,(1)(ζ)] ∗ I− λΓss,e,(1)}−1.
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A.2.4. Step 4: Solve for (Γys,(1), Γ`s,(1), Γws,(1), Γτs,(1))
The temporary equilibrium satisfies
yˆ =− ω(ηd + rˆ e − pˆie ′) + λcˆe ′(1) + (1− λ)cˆe ′(ζ),
ˆ` =yˆ − ηz ,
wˆ =ξ−1 ˆ`+ ω−1yˆ ,
τˆ =wy−1SS yˆ − ˆ`− wˆ .
(Γys,(1), Γ`s,(1), Γws,(1), Γτs,(1)) can be obtained from
Γys,(1) =− ω(Γd + Γrs,e,(1) − Γpis,e,(1)Γss,e,(1)) + [λΓcs,e,(1)(1) + (1− λ)Γcs,e,(1)(ζ)]Γss,e,(1),
Γ`s,(1) =Γys,(1) − Γz ,
Γws,(1) =ξ−1Γ`s,(1) + ω−1Γys,(1),
Γτs,(1) =wy−1SS Γ
ys,(1) − Γ`s,e,(1) − Γws,(1).
A.2.5. Step 5: Solve for Γpis,(1) and Obtain Γss,(1)
Denote βf = ΠSS/RSS The linearized Phillips Curve with arbitrary expectations E˜t is
pˆit =(1− θ)(1− βf θ)
∞∑
s=0
(βf θ)
s E˜t(wˆt+s − ηzt+s) + (1− θ)
∞∑
s=0
(βf θ)
s E˜t pˆit+s .
The matrix representation for (Γpis,(1), Γrs,(1)) is
Γpis,(1) =(1− θ)
{
[(1− βf θ)Γws,e,(1) + Γpis,e,(1)](I− βf θΓss,e,(1))−1 − 1− βf θ
1− βf θρz Γ
z
}
,
Γrs,(1) =ρrΓ
r + (1− ρr )(φpiΓpis,(1) + φyΓys,(1)).
Γss,(1) can be obtained from (Γys,(1), Γrs,(1)) and the exogenous law of motion for (ηd , ηz).
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A.2.6. Step 6: Update Expectations
For ∀k ∈ [1, +∞), first update expectations to [k] using
(Γys,e,(j+1), Γpis,e,(j+1), Γws,e,(j+1), Γτs,e,(j+1)) = (Γys,(j), Γpis,(j), Γws,(j), Γτs,(j)).
Level-k expectations are defined as
level-k = (1− k + [k]) · level-[k] + ([k]− k) · level-[k+1].
A.2.7. Step 7: State Space Representation
The transition equation is
sˆt+1 =

yˆt
rˆt
ηˆdt+1
ηˆzt+1

= Γss,(k)

yˆt−1
rˆt−1
ηˆdt
ηˆzt

+

0
σm
r
t
σd
d
t
σz
z
t

.
The measurement equation is

yˆt+1 − yˆt
pˆt+1 − pˆt
rˆt
 =

Γys − Γy
Γpis
Γr
 sˆt+1.
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The expectation equations and ex post counterparts are

yˆ et+4 − yˆt
pˆet+4 − pˆt
yˆt+4 − yˆt
pˆt+4 − pˆt

=

Γys,e,(k)(Γss,e,(k))3 − Γy
Γpis,e,(k)
∑3
τ=0(Γ
ss,e,(k))τ
Γys,(k)(Γss,(k))3 − Γy
Γpis,(k)
∑3
τ=0(Γ
ss,(k))τ

sˆt+1.
76
BIBLIOGRAPHY
H. Afrouzi. Strategic inattention, inflation dynamics and the non-neutrality of money.
Working Paper, 2017.
G.-M. Angeletos and J. La’O. Sentiments. Econometrica, 81:739–779, 2013.
G.-M. Angeletos and C. Lian. Forward guidance without common knowledge. American
Economic Review forthcoming, 2018.
R. B. Barsky and E. R. Sims. Information, animal spirits, and the meaning of innovation
in consumer confidence. American Economic Review, 102:1343–1377, 2012.
M. Bils, P. J. Klenow, and B. A. Malin. Resurrecting the role of the product market wedge
in recessions. American Economic Review, 108(4-5):1118–1146, 2018.
J. Boivin. Has u.s. monetary policy changed? evidence from drifting coefficients and real-
time data. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38:1149–1173, 2006.
C. F. Camerer, T.-H. Ho, and J.-K. Chong. A cognitive hierarchy model of games. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 119:861–898, 2004.
L. J. Christiano, M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans. Nominal rigidities and the dynamic
effects of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of Political Economy, 113(1):1–45, 2005.
L. J. Christiano, M. S. Eichenbaum, and M. Trabandt. Unemployment and business cycles.
Econometrica, 84(4):1523–1569, 2016.
R. Clarida, J. Gal´ı, and M. Gerlter. Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability:
Evidence and some theory. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:147–180, 2000.
V. P. Crawford, M. A. Costa-Gomes, and N. Iriberri. Structural models of nonequilibrium
strategic thinking: Theory, evidence, and applications. Journal of Economic Literature,
51, 2013.
S. Eusepi and B. Preston. Expectations, learning, and business cycle fluctuations. American
Economic Review, 101:2844–2872, 2011.
G. W. Evans and S. Honkapohja. Economic dynamics with learning: New stability results.
Review of Economic Studies, 65, 1998.
G. W. Evans, R. Guesnerie, and B. McGough. Eductive stability in real business cycle
models. Working Paper, 2017.
E. Farhi and I. Werning. Monetary policy, bounded rationality, and incomplete markets.
Working Paper, 2017.
77
E. Fehr and J.-R. Tyran. Limitied rationality and strategic interaction: The impact of the
strategic environment on nominal inertia. Econometrica, 76, 2008.
X. Gabaix. A sparsity-based model of bounded rationality. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
129:1661–1710, 2014.
X. Gabaix. Behavioral macroeconomics via sparse dynamic programming. Working Paper,
2017.
J. Gal´ı. Monetary Policy, Inflation and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New
Keynesian Framework. Princeton University Press, 2 edition, 2015.
M. Garc´ıa-Schmidt and M. Woodford. Are low interest rates deflationary? a paradox of
perfect-foresight analysis. Working Paper, 2016.
D. Gill and V. Prowse. Cognitive ability, charater skills, and learning to play equilibrium:
A level-k analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 124, 2016.
J. M. Grandmont. Temporary general equilibrium theory. Econometrica, 45, 1977.
R. E. Hall. What the cyclical response of advertising reveals about markups and other
macroeconomic wedges. Working Paper, 2014.
T. Havranek. Measuring intertemporal substitution: The importance of method choices
and selective reporting. Journal of European Economic Association, 13:1180–1204, 2015.
Z. Huo and J.-V. R´ıos-Rull. Paradox of thrift recessions. Working Paper, 2013.
L. Iovino and D. Sergeyev. Quantitative easing without rational expectations. Working
Paper, 2017.
G. Kaplan and G. L. Violante. A model of the consumption response to fiscal stimulus
payments. Econometrica, 82:1199–1239, 2014.
G. Kaplan, G. L. Violante, and J. Weidner. The wealthy hand-to-mouth. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity, 48:77–138, 2014.
R. Kim. Price-cost markup cyclicality: New evidence and implications. Working Paper,
2016.
N. G. Mankiw and R. Reis. Sticky information versus sticky prices: A proposal to replace
the new keynesian phillips curve. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117:1295–1328, 2002.
A. Marcet and T. J. Sargent. Convergence of least squares learning mechanisms in self-
referential linear stochastic models. Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 1989.
A. McKay, E. Nakamura, and J. Steinsson. The power of forward guidance revisited.
American Economic Review, forthcoming, 2016.
78
P. Michaillat and E. Saez. An economical business-cycle model. Working Paper, 2015.
F. Milani. Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence. Journal of Monetary
Economics, 54:2065–2082, 2007.
F. Milani. Expectation shocks and learning as drivers of the business cycle. Economic
Journal, 121:379–401, 2011.
M. D. Negro, M. P. Giannoni, and F. Schorfheide. Inflation in the great recession and new
keynesian models. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(1):168–196, 2015.
C. J. Nekarda and V. A. Ramey. The cyclical behavior of the price-cost markup. Working
Paper, 2013.
A. Orphanides. Monetary policy rules, macroeconomic stability, and inflation: A view from
the trenches. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36:151–175, 2004.
L. Phaneuf, E. Sims, and J. G. Victor. Inflation, output, and markup dynamics with
forward-looking wage and price setters. Working Paper, 2016.
F. Smets and R. Wouters. Shocks and frictions in us business cycle; a bayesian dsge ap-
proach. American Economic Review, 97(3):586–606, 2007.
M. Woodford. Imperfect common knowledge and the effects of monetary policy. In
P. Aghion, R. Frydman, J. Stiglitz, and M. Woodford, editors, Knowledge, Information,
and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 2003.
79
